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URBANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the current experience of most under-developed countries, as well 
as in the histories of those coioiAries that have experienced rapid economic 
growth in the past, the phenomena of xirbanization and economic development 
are closely inter-related. In any rational attempt to plan the economic 
development of a country, the two phenomena must be considered jointly, if 
it is desired to arrive at a consistent policy regarding either. 
In the present paper, an attempt will be made to clarify some of 
the ways in i/diich urbanization and economic development affect each other. 
The discussion will be focused primarily upon three major problem areas 
Ti\diere the two phenomena come into close contact: (i) locational forcesj 
(ii) social overhead capital; (iii) concentration versus dispersion. 
1. The problems of the location of economic activities are fundamental 
to the understanding of urban development, since the industries and other 
activities which are located or expand in a city determine to an over-
whelming extent the course of development of that city, its growth and 
relative importance, its character and pattern of living. It is well 
known that a great many industries are attracted to urban areas; conversely, 
towns are often formed around a nucleus of basic industries. Industrial 
location is also inter-related with the stock of social overhead capital 
embodied in urban facilities, since industries follow, and, conversely, 
generate more social overhead capital. Likewise, industrial location is 
one of the factors determining the concentration of population, production, 
income, capital, skills, etc.j while conversely, it is also influenced, 
~ either attracted or repelled, - by concentration- All of these inter-
relations need to be explained in more "detail. 
2. Social overhead capital consists of certain types of basic capital, 
principally virban, transport and public servicé facilities, which are 
indispensable for the development of an industrial economy, but which yield 
their most essential services primarily outside the channels of market 
exchange. Among the urban social overhead capital facilities are houses 




schools and hospitals, etc. Some of these (for example, houses and 
commercial buildings) yield a monetary return; however, they also help 
to provide the urban environment without which modern industry cannot 
operate. This can be seen characteristically when an industry has \in-
avoidably to be established in the backwoods; in such a case, the productive 
investment is burdened with additional investment in workers' housing, 
commercial, recreation and health facilities, transport routes, etc-
In Latin America, as probably in .most under-developed regions of the 
v;orld, an excessively large proportion of new capital formation is channelled 
into certain urban facilities> especially luxury housing-aií3." modern office 
buildings. At the same tim:e, capital is drawn away from more productive 
investment, and even from other much-needed categories of urban social 
overhead facilities, such as housing for the lower income groups. This 
problem must be examined more closely. Another related problem concerns 
the timing of social overhead investments: should they anticipate the needs 
of the economy, in order to stimulate growth, or should they lag behind 
demand to some extent, in order to liberate capital for more directly 
productive uses? 
The problem of concentration versus dispersion can be readily broken 
down into the following two sub-problems: (i) the inter-relations of 
metropolitan and urban nuclei of different sizes, each with its own tributary 
regions; and (ii) the internal organization of major metropolitan districts 
In the case of both sub-problems, one has the vague notion that "too much" 
concentration gives rise to excessively high social costs, due to congestion, 
traffic problems, difficulties of organizing food supply and wastage disposal, 
etc; while contrariwise, if there is "too little" concentration, the 
economies of urban aggregation, such as the elimination of transport costs 
on intermediate products, the rapid interchange of goods and services, the 
sharing of common transport and service facilities, etc., are partially 
foregone. The phenomenon of concentration is, furthermore, linked ̂ îth 
the distribution of social overhead capital. The concentration of income 
provides the resoxirces out of which more social overhead capital can be 
created; while conversely, industries are attracted to zones with ample 
existing stocks of social overhead capital and these, in türn, generate 
. /a further 
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a further concentration of the same by the additional income to which they 
give rise. The concentration problem is further related to the problems 
of minimtun economic scales, migration, and the dispersion of risks and 
ent repreneurship. 
In the following three sections, the problems of industrial location, 
social overhead capital, and concentration versus dispersion, will be taken 
up in turn with special reference to their inter-relationships. On the 
basis of this analysis, the major issues of developmental and urban policy 
will be discussed in a final section. 
The discussion presented in this paper is meant primarily for back-
ground purposes. No original contribution is inbendedj indeed, such a 
contribution would have to rely primarily on a much more thorough empirical 
survey of the field than the materials at present available permit. In 
various parts of the paper, attention is drawn to the type of empirical 
information urgently needed for a more fundamental attack on the problems 
presented. 
II. INDUSTRIAL LOCATION 
A. Locational forces 
The location of an industry ^^ is detemined by the interplay of many 
locational forces, such as the influence of raw materials, markets, cheap 
labour, advantages of an urban zone, etc. These forces exert their influence 
in different geographical directionsj the actual point of location may be 
regarded as representing a compromise between the conflicting forces. If 
one or two of the forces are preponderant in the case of a given industry, 
the latter is said to be correspondingly oriented. Thus, an industry may 
be oriented to its raw materials, to its markets, to cheap labour, etc. 
The principal types of orientation arej 
(a) geographical orientation: 
(i) transport orientation (raw materials, markets, trans-
shipment points)5 
1/ "Industry" will be used in the broad sense, to denote any important 





(ii) orientation to a factor or a condition of production 
(labour, power, taxes, skills, water, waste disposal)^ 
(b) agglomerative orientation: 
(i) orientation determined by economies of interaction between 
industriesJ 
(ii) orientation determined by economies of scale. 
Geographical orientation is based on a given geographical pattern of 
raw materials, markets, transport routes.and factor supplies* Thus, a 
geographically oriented industry is attracted to predetermined, fixed 
points of location, such as a mineral deposit, a major market, a port, or 
a cheap-labour area- Contrariwise, agglomerative orientation is largely 
independent of geography. Industries which have an agglomerative orient-
ation are attracted to each other, but the act\xal geographical point at 
which the aggregation takes place is, as far as the agglomerative forces 
are concerned, a inatter of indifference. The practical consequence of 
this tjrpe of orientation is that aggloineratively oriented industries will 
aggregate wherever an initial concentration has taken place.. 
The varieties of geographical orientation are sufficiently obvious 
to require little further comment. In general, intermediate points of 
location between raw material sources and markets are eschewed, unless 
(1) heavy trans-shipment costs are avoidable by siting industries at such 
points or (ii) unless raw material sources or markets are widely dispersed 
and distribution is the decisive factor in location. In the agglomerative 
orientation category, economies of interaction between industries may 
consist in the development of a common labour pool with special skills, 
in common service and marketing facilities, and in the elimination of 
transport costs on intermediate goods- Economies of large-scale production 
are well-known; their effect is to tend to merge several small, separately 
located productive facilities into a single large whole. 
B. Special problems 
Three important special problems of industrial location with respect 
to urbanization and economic development are the following: (1) a combination 
of geographical orientation with the influence of economies of scale; 




influence of the developmental sequence on location. 
1. Geographical orientation and scale 
(i) A combination of market orientation with economies of scale leads 
to orientation towards urban districts- Clearly, market orientation by-
it self will not necessarily attract industries to cities. For example, the 
bakery industry in Latin America is market-oriented and widely dispersed} 
there is no tendency for this industry to concentrate its production sites 
in a few major cities. The reason for this is that there are no net 
economies of scale. (Whatever econcanies of scale may exist in production 
are more than offset by diseconomies of scale in distribution, such as 
delays and deterioration.) Thus, many small individual markets are served 
by production sites of their own in this industry. Conversely, the metal-
transforming indT:stries are typically attracted to cities. While market-
orientation and economies of large scale are not the only factors 
responsible for this (further factors will appear below), they contribute 
their share toward the result. 
(ii) A combination of raw-material or transport-junction orientation 
with the effects of economies of large scale, may give rise to new independent 
urban nuclei. Mining towns, sea and river ports are in this category. The 
role of the economies of large scale is decisive in the formation of an 
urban nucleus when there is a geographical dispersion of small mines or 
of alternative, naturally favourable harbour sites; in these cases, the 
economies of scale im ore-processing or in transport-terminal installations 
lead to the development of a single (or a few) powerfully developing urban 
nuclei rather than to the proliferation of smaller ones-
2. The role of industrial integration 
Industries characterized by a large degree of integration ~ are much 
more independent of cities in their location than industries characterized 
by many separate stages and products, each organized into an independent 
2/ "Vertical" integration consists of the organization of several stages 
of production in a single firmj "horizontal" integration consists of 
the organization of several related processes, usually producing 




business. Thus, for example, most of the great integrated steel plants 
in Latin America (Volta Redonda) Huachipato, Paz de Rio, Chiiabote, San 
3/ 
Nicolas) are located in.non*urban districts.-' Basic petrochemicals and 
other heavy-process industries, such as cemenl̂ , likevrise enjoy a marked 
degree of independence from cities. Contrariwise, the typical metal-
transforming industries show a much smaller degree of integration and are 
powerfxilly attracted to urban, and especially to metropolitan, centres-
Good examples are the motor industries of Sao Paulo, Cordoba and Belo 
Horizonte. 
3• Locational evolution 
The, locational forces which are predominant during the early stages 
of economic development have a powerfully determining effect on the entire 
subsequent pattern of urban growth, since the early urban nuclei act as 
kernels for the agglomeration process infaich, by itself, is independent of 
geography. It is thus a cxirious fact that early influences on urbanization, 
like childhood liupr-essions, continue to exert a controlling effect as it 
were> "miderground", man;/ years after they have ostensibly ceased to exist. 
Another way of approaching the same phenomenon is'to observe that, 
locational changes are hi^ly irreversible, especially in the short run. 
Thus, when a locational change takes place, the various forces can exert 
their influence freely; however, once an action is completed - a railroad 
built, a port constructed, a steel mill launched, a city founded - it 
becomes an almost immovable part of the geographical-historical surroundings 
which control subsequent locational changes. These alterations in turn, 
consolidate the given pattern of evolution even further, until finally a 
clearly recognizable historical trend of location.and urbanization emerges, 
which, in part, may have been determined originally by fortuitous 
circvimstances. 
Of course, this is not the only trend which controls locational 
evolution. It is offset by the selective elimination of badly located 
activities and their physical embodiments. Abandoned roads, declining 
2./ It should be noted, however, that these steel plants are typically 




towns and neglected harbours testify, to the fact that, in the long riin, 
the locational patterns of an econonQr have a higher degree of flexibility 
than a superficial inspection would indicate. In order to plan economic 
development this phenomenon must be thoroughly understood. 
In Latin America at present, the most jjnportant effects of the 
locational evolution process noted above are connected with the transition 
from the stage of simple to that of more complex manufacturing. In brief, 
apart from the usual foreign enclaves-in the underdeveloped economies, such 
as mining or banana companies, the first stage of economic development 
consists of primary production, the most elementary food-processing, 
rudimentary transport, simple construction, and apart from these, repair 
and maintenance, handicrafts, commerce and services. Most countries of 
the region have progressed beyond this stage to that of the production of 
consumer goods: more elaborate food-processing, textiles, household 
necessities, as well as ancillary nfital-transforru.'.ng activities connected 
vith repair and maintenance. The third stage consists of more highly 
developed mctal-transfonnLng activities and the establisliment of basic 
industries, jjuch as steel, chemicals and ce;ii3rdi. In terms of locational 
evolution, the first stage is characterized by a high degree of industrial 
dispersion. The typical urban iinit is the counfcry town. During the 
second stages, there is a strong tendency fcr the rapid growth of a smaller 
number of urban centres, since the typical industries of the second stage 
are attracted to the principal markets, the social overhead facilities 
and the pools of better-trained labour available at the larger centres. 
Thus, the second stage initiates the self-reinforcing growth and concentra-
tion process of the urban areas which will be discussed in more detail below^ 
The transition to the third stage is marked by two contrary tendencies. 
On the one hand, the more complex metal-transforming activities that mark 
the third stage are pov/erfully attracted to the very , largest metropolitan 
centresj and on the other hand, as indicated before, many basic industries 
(steel, chemicals and cement), are largely independent of cities. If the 
process of transition is uncontrolled, there seems to be a tendency for 
those industries intrinsically less tied to cities, to develop nevertheless 





severely the metropolitan and regional problems arising from the transition-
There is hardly any major metropolitan area in Latin America vdiich does 
not have its share of these grave difficulties. Yet at the same time, the 
very existence of a series of heavy industries that are not strongly 
attracted to urban zones provides the planner with one of his most important 
tools for controlling and redirecting the pattern of urbanization. 
III. SOCIAL OVERHEAD CAPITAL 
From the point of view of economic development, the two main classes 
of social overhead capital are those connected with urbanization and with 
transport. 
Economic development typically follows social overhead capital on the 
one hand, while creating more of it on the other- Thus, as indicated in 
the introduction, many industries are strongly attracted to the social 
overhead facilities and industrial milieu that is found in the cities; 
however, by the very fact of this attraction and ohe consequent establish-
ment of additional indu5'".ries 5.n the city, more i??.come is generated. This 
in turri pro\ldes the resources out of which , thro.:gh one institutioiial 
mechanism or another, more new social overhead capital is built up. Like-
wise, many new industries are attracted to existing transport facilities, 
such as ports, railroads, good highways, etc- However, by increasing the 
volume of traffic, they not only require but also justify the improvement 
of transport facilities. Other industries are thus attracted too. 
The present section will concentrate on urban social overhead capital. 
The most important transport problems, especially as they affect urbanization, 
will be summarized. 
^' Urban Social Overhead Capital 
1. Definition 
The following is a list of the major physical facilities associated 
with urban development: 
i) Housing. a) Low density, free-standing. 
b) High density, free-standing. 
c) Apartments and tenements. 




ii) Streets, including paving and lighting, 
iii) Subsurface construction: sewers, utility lines-
iv) Schools and hospitals. 
v) Buildings for general administration of the city and its services. 
vi) Facilities for police and fire protection. 
vii) Transit facilities, transport terminals and outside connexions. 
viii) Facilities for educational, labour, ani social-welfare services, 
parks and recreation grounds. 
ix) Basic utilities: power, water, gas: plants and distribution net. 
x) Office buildings, 
xi) Shops for commerce and the services, 
xii) Factories: a) Light manufacturing. 
b) Heavy manufacturing. 
Social overhead capital, by definition, yields its services outside of 
the channels of market exchange. Streets, public buildings, police and 
fire protection facilities, public schools, are clearly in this category. 
The situation is not so clear with regard to utilities or workers' housing. 
The production of electric power, or the construrtion of houses for the 
purpose of selling or renting them, is a commercial, activity; yet power 
and workers' housing are both indispensable for industrial development: 
their lack or shortage can seriously hamper the growth of a city. Accord-
ingly, the corresponding facilities yield a social service in addition to 
the commercial product they produce, since the availability of these 
products has a significance which apparently exceeds their monetary value-
However, the same thing can be said, to a greater or lesser degree, of 
practically any productive sector- The availability of steel has a well-
known stimulating effect on industrial growth: should a steel plant, 
accordingly, be labeled as a social overhead capital facility? Likewise, 
the local availability of a series of products and services in the city 
saves time and money for many other businesses: to the extent that such 
savings arise from the mere presence of economic activities, should their 
facilities not be regarded as part of the social overhead capital? 
The crux of the difficulty is that, in a market economy, productive 




that are not taken into account by the price system. Thus, all capital is, 
in some degree, social overhead capital- Under the circumstances, the 
question arises whether it is useful to maintain the distinction between 
ordinary capital and social overhead capital? 
In practice, the distinction is, of course, highly useful. First of 
all, most of the physical facilities listed earlier can be classified 
approximately into one or the other of the two categories. With the 
marginal items, the decision deperais primarily on the use that is to be 
made of the classification. 
The concept of social overhead capital plays its primary role with regard 
to investment decisions. In thi's respect, social overhead capital differs 
from ordinary productive capital in three principal ways- First, social 
overhead investments are generally financed from public funds, raised through 
taxation^ and the mechanism of decision with regard to them is a mechanism 
of public, often parliamentary, deliberation, rather than the decentralized 
process of commercial decision-making that is characteristic of private 
investment decisions. It is intei-esting to note that with regai'd to the 
marginal items, such as utilities or subsidized housing, the decision-
making process is often a transition between the above two extremes-
Second, the evaluation of the benefits of social overhead capital invest-
ments, due to the very lack of a price system for describing these benefits, 
has to be undertaken on the basis of different criteria, including political 
and social considerations, both in comparing different social overhead 
capital investment projects among themselves, and in comparing such projects 
with directly productive investments. Third, since there is no, price 
mechanism that would eqvdlibrate the costs and benefits of social overhead 
capital services from the point of view of the individual productive 
enterprises, social overhead capital can create hidden incentives, or, in 
some cases, if inequitable taxation is used for financing social overhead 
investments, disincentives, for individual economic activities. 
2- Inter-relations between Social Overhead Capital and Productive Capital 
Social overhead capital paiiily cooperates and partly competes with 
ordinary productive capital. It cooperates in the sense that certain minimum 




For example, production is not possible if the working force is not housed 
in one way or another. (Even if this housing is provided at slum standards, 
there is an indispensable ndnimtaa of police and fire protection, general 
adfflinistration, etc., connected with it.) On the other hand, social over-
head capital competes with productive capital in the sense that it makes 
demands on the scarce investment funds of an economy. This is especially 
important in tinderdeveloped countries, where, due to a low absolute income 
level as iiíell as a generally low savings rate, the availability of capital 
is critically restricted. 
The competitive function of social overhead capital has, in turn, two 
distinct aspects which are connected with the nature of the services 
provided by the social overhead facilities-
i) As has been indicated before, these services can have an intermediate 
character with respect to production, in the sense that they do not become 
a part of final demand. Such intermediate services are exactly analogous 
to intermediate goods which are used up in the productive process itself. 
The intermeciate servicia include all elements thet contribute to higher 
labour productivity, such as education, health, welfare, etc.j they also 
include the public service aspects of utilities and housing. 
ii) The services of social overhead capital can alternately form a part 
of final consumption, such as, for example, public recreational faci].ities. 
Both of the above two kinds of competitive functions of social overhead 
capital manifest themselves by making danands on the capital budget of an 
economy. The first kind, which relates to the role of social overhead 
capital as a productive factor, reduces the availability of ordinary 
productive capital in the production processi the second kind, which relates 
to the role of social overhead capital as a supplier of a certain type of 
final consumption service, reduces the capital that is available for the 
production of other types of products and services for final demand. 
Due to the fact that the benefits ..of social overhead capital are, by 
definition, not priced in the market place, it is difficult to quantify 
the exact extent to which social overhead capital cooperates with productive 
capital. It is unquestionable that all the urban facilities enumerated 




be regarded as only directly productive, such as utilities), are nevertheless 
essential in creating the typically urban atmosphere which is associated 
with efficient production in many branches of economic activity. It is 
also intuitively acceptable to assume that productivity increases as the 
amount of social overhead capital associated with a given supply of other 
factors (including directly productive capital) increases. It is, however, 
not at all obvious what is the minimum amount of social overhead capital 
that an economy needs to be able to produce at alii what is the best 
distribution of this social overhead capital between different facilities; 
and Tiáiat is the optimum proportion of social overhead to productive capital 
for a given set of social goals, such as a maximum growth rate consistent 
with prescribed consumption standards. 
Perhaps the best way of approaching these problems from a practical point 
of view is through the definition of standards for social overhead capital 
investment. 
3 • Standards for Social Overhead FaciJ-î -ies 
In the task of defining standards, it ±n convenient to start with the 
extremes. At one extreme, one might say that in order to achieve advanced 
and efficient industrial production, it is necessary to have a high level 
of productivity. This, in turn, is associated vrith a certain general 
cultural level and a standard of living which demands decent workers' 
housing, high-grade education and health facilities, ample, social welfare 
services, and so forth. A standard of social overhead capital investment 
embodying these characteristics will be referred to as a "high productive" 
standard. At the other extreme, one may define an absolute rock-bottpm 
minimum of social overhead capital requiremerrt,, which is associated with 
frankly slum-standard dwellings and related other facilities serving a 
marginal, floating urban population. Even slums have streets and must 
have a certain minimum of street lighting, police and fire protection, 
general administrative and health services, in order to prevent them from I 
being positive menaces to the other parts of a city. Thus, inescapably, 
even at slum standards it is necessary to associate some social overhead 
capital with directly productive capital. Between the two extremes, there 




In the more advanced countries, a considerable amount of work has been 
done on urban planning standards -with regard to housing densities, schools 
and playgrounds, social services, zoning for different urban land uses, and 
similar problems. Unfortunately, little of this work has been related to 
the problem of production and the allocation of scarce resources, even in 
the context of an advanced economy; a fortiori, there are few parts of this 
experience that can be applied to the twin problems of urbanization and 
economic development in underdeveloped countries. 
The problem of defining standards applicable to these countries will 
require an essentially new start, based on two types of complementary 
information, i) The collection and evaluation of quantitative data on 
the amount and structure of social overhead capital investment in different 
urban areas of the world, representing a wide range of economic development 
levels. This type of empirical infomation can be expected to reveal the 
existence of general trends as well as significant deviations from these 
trends. For example, it would be of great interest to know the relation-
ship bstweei'. the percent:.age distribirt-ion of capital between directly 
productive and urban social overhead uses on the one hand, and the per 
capita income levels in metropolitan areas and their tributary regions 
on the other. It would be of equal interest to note whether the especially 
fast-growing or slow-growing economies show systematic deviations from the 
general trend, and if so, in what sense, ii) The second type of new 
information that is required relates to the definition of standards 
corresponding to "high productive", "slum" and intermediate levels of 
urban social overhead investment, on the basis of the judgments of experts 
and practical planners. 
4• Distribution of Capital between Productive and Social-Overhead 
Facilities 
In considering the problem of the best distribution of scarce capital 
resources in an underdeveloped country between productive and social over-
head uses, three special problems have to be kept in mind. 
First, completely apart from the desirability of a higher level of 
general urban facilities as an end in itself, it is not at all a foregone 




overhead capital (the "slum" standard), is the most efficient one from 
the point of view of maximizing cvirrent physical production. It should 
be borne in mind that social overhead capital cooperates with directly-
productive capital; and, especially at low proportions of social overhead 
capital to directly productive capital, the cooperative function may well 
outweigh the competitive function. In other words, at low levels of urban 
social overhead capital investment, it is entirely conceivable that a 
marginal dollar invested in more social overhead capital will increase 
total physical product by a larger amount than the same dollar invested in 
directly productive capital. This may come about, for example, through a 
large increase ixi the productivity of the working force due to the marginal 
investment in social overhead facilities. 
Second, as indicated earlier, social overhead facilities, in addition 
to cooperating with physical production, may also render services iidiich 
are directly constimed outside of the channels of market exchange. This 
consumption may, in turn, be collective oi* particular- For example, the 
services of a public-garden are "co?ulectiyely consumed". The high-quality 
paving and lighting of streets habitually observed in the better residential 
areas of cities are also consumed in part "collectively" - to the extent 
that the street is used for public tr^sit, - and in part privately, to 
the extent that the street serves the convenience and prestige of its 
residents. It should be observed that this tĵ pe of consumption generally 
shows a regressive distribution with regard to family income levels which 
is more accentuated at the lower pier capita incomes of the underdeveloped 
countries. Apart from the typically unequal treatment of different 
neighbourhoods, which constitutes an obvious case in point, the "collective 
consumption", of such things as statues or luxurious public buildings in 
poor countries cuts primarily into the food budgets of the lower-income 
families- Thus, if the contribution of social overhead capital to total 
product is considered, and if the directly consumed component of the 
income generated by social, overhead facilities is counted as a part of 
total product, a completely false picture of social benefit may be obtained 




Third, the very fact that it is not feasible to associate a strictly-
defined amount of social overhead capital "need" with physical production, 
i.e., that variable "standards" of social overhead facilities are technically 
possible, opens up a field of discretionary action frcan the point of view 
of the practical planner of economic developauert.. In effect, the need for 
social overhead facilities is compressible, especially in the short run-
Thus, if a city is growing and industrializing rapidly, it is possible to 
maintain temporarily a pool of marginally employed or underemployed, 
floating urban population at extremely low standards of social overhead 
investment, and thereby to liberate capital for more directly productive 
needs. The existence of such a pool enables the economic activities of 
the city, including the dynamic industries, to expand their working force 
without the need for incurring social overhead investments, especially 
workers' housing, at their own expense, and thus constitutes one of the 
great attractions of urban areas for many industries. Of course, those 
workers who enter productive employment frena the pool of floating labour, 
have to be ?.ifted reasor^bly rapidly to levels of urban living that are 
in excess oi the slum standard, otherwise long-run productivity will be 
adversely affected and intolerable social tensions might develop. This 
requires additional investment in social overhead facilities. The point 
is, however, that such investments need not be undertaken by the employing 
industries thenselves. The necessary facilities may be created by public 
or subsidized private investment. In any event, a good part of the burden 
of creating these new facilities may be borne by the newly employed workers. 
The advantage of such an arrangement is that it creates social overhead 
facilities primarily in response to the needs of the productively employed 
increment of the working force; in other words, the resultant social 
overhead facilities will be created to the extent that they cooperate vdth 
industrial production. It should be noted that the provision of higher-
standard facilities for the entire pool of marginal labour, rather than 
only for the newly employed workers, wotild divert scarce social overhead 
capital for the purpose of supplying final consumption services. 
Accordingly, the maintenance of a pool of marginal urban labour at the 




credit to economic development. As workers are productively employed out 
of the pool, they are replaced by the urban population incrementa, vdiich 
originates to a significant extent in the well-knovna process of migration 
toward the cities, typical of all underdeveloped countries. Thus the pool 
maintains itself, or, more typically, tends to grow; moreover, due to the 
selective employment of its best-qualified members, it tends to concentrate 
within itself the less productive part of the urban population increment! 
The compression of social overhead capital needs by the mechanism 
described above is, of course, highly inequitable in that it places the 
greatest burden on those who are least able to defend themselves- The 
less active, the less intelligent, the old, the sick, the emotionally 
distiirbed, the unattached women and their children: these are the ones 
who tend to stagnate in the marginal urban population, even urider the 
best of conditions, i.e., when the employable persons are actually absorbed 
at a sufficiently fast rate to prevent their spending an excessive period 
of time waiting for their turn. In a concrete situation^ considerations 
of economic -growth have to be balanced against considerations of equity of 
this kind. Unfortunately, the social overhead capital needs of a rapidly 
growing and urbanizing population are so overwhelming that in practice 
there may be little choice or no choice at all in this respect. 
Finally, the compression of social overhead capital requirements has a 
technical as well as a social side. The immediate capital costs of sewers, 
traffic arteries, etc., may be cut down by underdimensiohing them. The 
resultant saving is, however, purchased at the cost of far greater future 
expenditures, since the enlargement of small-diameter pipes or excessively 
narrow streets is a substantially more e3q)ensive process than building 
them somewhat larger in the first place. In this respect it should be 
noted that the typical fom of Latin American slums - the shaintytown of 
freestanding units - mi^t very T«rell be a highly expensive proposition in 
the long run, since it is-characterized by an excessively low residential 
density, and thus requires huge areas for accommodating a given population. 
This, in tiim, increases the problem of utility connexions, protective 
services, and transit, and, in addition, may cut off the rest of the city 
from its natural lines of expansion. 
/$. The Structure 
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5, The Structure and Benefits of Urban Social Overhead Investmenbs 
A striking phenomenon connected vfith investments in urban social 
overhead facilities is the variety of agencies that have a hand in thou. 
Streets, sewers, public buildings, parks, and in part, schools and 
hospitals are usually provided by public agencies, and are typically 
financed from tax funds. However, many schools and hospitals are provided 
and Controlled by private organizations, partly as a public service, and 
in Some cases on a, commercial basis. Housing is largely provided by the 
private sector, bub in many instances, low-income housing is publicly 
subsidized or provided by semi-public organizations, such as mutual 
insurance funds. Transit facilities, utility plants and distribution net-
works are typically pri.vately-own^, but operate on a public-service 
basis, with strong public regulation. Commercial and industrial facilities 
are, of course, with minor ®xceptí.ons, privately-owned and operated. The 
situation is complicated by the fact that in most cases, public investments 
and their control are divided between a variety of agencies, representing 
different levels of government. The urban zone itself may be cut up 
between several autonomous municipalities; in addition, there are usually 
regulator and investment functions that correspond to the regional (state, 
province, department) level, and others that correspond to the national 
(federal, central) levaL, 
Under such conditions, it is easy to see that, generally speaking, no 
good co-ordination of investments in various uiban facilities can be 
expected. In the more developed countries, this has been recognized and 
remedied by the establishment of central urban planning agencies that have 
been concerned primarily with urban land use, transit, and the provision 
of public services. In underdeveloped countries, the problem is furthCT' 
complicated by the in̂ jerious necessity of considering investment in urban 
social overhead facilities within the framework of the entire problaa of 
econondc development and capital allocation. In the face of this need, 
the actual situation in most underdeveloped countries, and specifically in 
Latin America, is that the structure of urban social overhead investments 
is unknown and consequently uncontrolleds Even on superficial. obsei*vation, 
it is obvious that a disquietingly high proportion of total investment , 




metropolitan centers; moreover, tiaere, is a simultaneous over- and under-
investment in social overhead capital; as'cited earlier, too much goes 
into luxury housing and high-class office buildings, too little into the 
housing and facilities serving the lower income groups. 
Another unfortunate feature of the present situation vdth regard to 
urban social overhead investment is the follovdlng. Since there is no 
appreciation of the costs of the distinct classes of social overhead 
facilities, nor of the distribution of the benefits they conv^, there is 
no consciousness of the vadespread subsidization of marqr ecorlomic activities 
in the largest urban centers at the expense of activities at the periphery. 
Ideally, the balance between the urban services obtained by individual 
productive enterprises, and the contribution thqy make to the financing 
of these services, in the form of taxes, should be used to regulate the 
process of urban concentration- At present, the process is typically out 
of control, and also typically leaves the urban enterprises vdth a'favour-
able balance between contributions made and benefits received. It woxild 
be instructive to stucfy this phenomenon empiricaii^ in sufficient detail 
to establish how much of the generally observed urban over-concentration 
process in Latin America can be explained by reference to this factor alone, 
B. Social Overhead Capital Embodied in Fixed Transport Facilities 
While the social overhead investments in transport facilities, such 
as transport arteries (roads, railroads, canals), terminals (ports, 
stations, pito lie loading and storage facilities) and interchanges (cross-
ings, junctions, locks), have an extremely important effect on economic 
development in general and on the urbanization process in particular, very 
little is known to date about the criteria to be followed with regard to 
these investments in the context of economic development programming. Yet 
such knowledge would be required with great urgency in the formulation of 
rational programme of regional and tirban development. 
The main features of the problem can be stated as follows. Obviously, 
the investment in fix^ transport facilities affects the cost of tranportl 
ation. The latter, on the other hand, influences strongly the pattern of 
industrial location, which in turn determines the Volume of traffic between 




on the investmeiit decisions relating to transport facilities. The 
phenomena of urbanization, however, depend critically on the locational 
pattern of economic activities that emerges from the above closed chain 
of interactions. Thus, to understand the xirbanization process, it is 
necessary to penetrate the complex interrelations between transport and 
production. 
1. The Structure of Transport Costs 
Transport costs can be broken dovm into three elements: overhead 
costs, direct costs and Congestion costs. Overhead cosjts include interest, 
depreciation and maintenance on the fixed investment. Direct costs 
include interest, depreciation and maintenance of irolling stock or ships; 
interest and insurance on goods in transit; fuels and lubricants; and 
various categories of labour and related costs. Congestion costs are the 
costs associated váth the slovdng down of traffic flow in overloaded 
transport networks. 
An investment in fixed transport facilities necessarily reduces, or 
at worst, leaves unchanged, direct costs and congestion costs. Direct 
costs are reduced due to time and materials saved by the use of improved 
transport facilities; the reduction of congestion costs is obvious. How-
ever, the effect of the new investment on overhead costs per unit of 
transit is less definite, and depends on the relation between additional 
investment, additional transport capacity, and degree of utilization. If 
the capacity of the transport network increases faster than the investment, 
and if the degree of utilization .is high, unit overhead costs will fall. 
These costs can likewise fall if the d ^ e e of utilization inproves 
significantly, due to lower direct or congestion costs. In these cases, 
all components of unit transport cost diminish with increasing investment. 
On the other hand, at low traffic densities, the additional investment may 
not be justified if the fall in direct costs is more than offset by a rise 
in iinit overhead costs, (Congestion costs do not occur in such cases,) 
2, The Dynamic Effects of Transport Costs 
Obviously, a purely static comparison of costs is not an adequate 
criterion for makiiig investment decisions xd.th regard to fixed transport 
facilities. It has to be take,n into account that the cost structure 




transport costs and the volme of traffic, which results in the conctitration 
of economic activities in some areas and in the retardation of others, 
' The chain of causation works in the following way.. If transport conr-
nections are poor between certain póints, traffic will tend to avoid this 
routé: industries will be influenced to locate in such a way as to 
eliminate the high transport cost associated with the poor transport 
facilities. Accordingly, traffic density on the route mil remain low. 
While this is the case, however, there will be no incentive to improve the 
route, sirice additional investment under conditions of low traffic density, 
as seen earlier, may well result in higher unit transport costs than 
before. Thus the chain of causation runs from bad facilities to high costs 
to low traffic density to lack of improvement of bad facilities. The 
result is that the area served by the poor transport route will experience 
a retarding effect on its grovrth, while a corresponding additional stimulus 
to growth is created in more fortunate areas. 
In the latter areas, transport connections are better, and transport 
costs correspondingly lower. The economic activities attracted by the 
lower transport costs generate additional traffic; the resulting higher 
traffic density creates an incentive for additional investment in the given 
transport routes, since this will lower transport costs. The lower costs, 
in turn, reinitiate the cycle of causation, which runs from better, facilities 
to lox̂ rer costs to higher traffic density to further improvements, of-facil-
ities. 
3. The Social-Overhead Functions of Transport Facilities 
Transport faciliü.es have two principal social-overhead fxmctions: ~ 
(i) the full cost of fixed investments is often not charged to the user, 
i.e., on public roads or under special railroad fare policies; (ii) a 
transport network conveys extraordinarily important benefits to all economic 
activities, even those that áre not directly served by it; and these 
benefits are not priced in the maricét, 
(i) With regard to the first point, it should be noted that the 
exact determination of iiriit overhead costs is rendered very difficult by 
the following facts. 
First, there is a question as to "ydiether all of the overhead costs 




adjoining property experience a rise in the value of this property, and 
that they should bear a corresponding share of the costs. It is also 
argued that the conrraunities served by the route obtain indirect benefits 
and shoxild contribute to the cost accordingly. (Both of these consider-
ations touch upon the second class of social-overhead function mer&ioned 
above,) There is very little theoretical basis for making an exact 
evaluation; in a concrete situation, some division may be made on a 
largely arbitrary basis, (A case in point is an interesting study by the 
Highway Department' of the State of Washington, U.S,A,) 
Secondly, even if the share of overhead costs to be borne collectively 
by the users of a transport network is determined, it is difficult to 
divide these costs between different classes of users. To cite the example 
of a highway: physical deterioration is affected by the weight and speed 
of the vehicles; the timing of the use of the hi^way affects the fluct-
uations of traffic density, and thus, for example, congestion costs during 
periods of heavy use; the choice of route across a transport network by 
the individual vehicle affects the capacity of all sections of the network, 
etc, etc. Similar problems arise in assigning joint costs to different 
classes of uses of a railroad network, or of á system of canals or ports. 
In spite of the difficulty of evaluating unit transport costs, a great 
effort is justified in this field, in order to avoid among other things, 
the subsidization of urban overconcentration. It so happens that congest-
ion becomes the mjor problem with regard to the organization of entering 
and leaving traffic in the larger metropolitan areas, and its solution 
requires highly costly investments. If the exact costs corresponding to 
individual parts of a transport network are not known, it will typically 
happen that the, costliest parts are subsidized, through the device of 
charging average costs everywhere. This is especially true in the case of 
rail and highway traffic. If, for example, an attempt were made to 
estí-mate and charge the true marginal costs corresponding to the complex-
ities of a metropolican road interchange system, the subsidization of 
industries located inside the metropolitan areas could be avoided, and 
the corresponding retarding effect on smaller urban centers could be 
checked. 
It is noted that the problem of assigning the exact costs correspond-




corresponding charge as a policy instnment, for creating incentives or 
disincentives for given traffic flows. In principle, such a policy coxild 
be highly effective if used by an efficient planning agency idth a view to 
promoting rapid and balanced growth. In practice, however, the structure 
of charges (for example, railroad fares) can easily become a tool in the 
struggle of powerful pressure groups intent on promoting their parochial 
aims; accordingly, in a given case it might be wiser to renounce the use 
of this particular instrument than to risk the opening up of a political 
Pandora's box, 
(ii) The indirect benefits of an improved transport system that 
accrue to all economic activities consist of the lowering of the production 
costs of all products and services that use transport directly or indirectly. 
For example, if the transport costs on iron ore are reduced, the effects of 
this reduction i.-dll redound to the benefit of all users of iron and steel 
and its products. Since transport is by far the widest-used of all inter-
mediate comodities, the direct and indirect benefits of a tr^sport cost 
reduction will spread throughout the whole economy. 
The benefits of a given transport cost reduction achieved through 
investment in transport facilities are more difficult to evaluate than the 
benefits of, say, a reduction of steel cost, achieved by technological 
improvement. The reason for this is that any one ton of steel is like any 
other ton of steel in all of its uses; however, transport services are 
geographically "differentiated, and thus, a given transport inprovement is 
different in its effects from any other transport improvement. Generally 
speaking, it is, however, obvious that the major benefits of a transport 
network will be captured by the areas directly served by this network, and 
that the cumulative effects of the indirect benefits will be greater in 
proportion to the degree of self-sufficiency of these areas, 
4» Effects of Transport on Urbanization 
The principal effects of transport on urbanization may be summarized 
as follows: 
(i) The interaction of transport costs and investment in new transport 
facilities has a strongly concentrating effect that idll tend to focus 
economic growth into a few favpvired regions and their urban centers, and to 
retard growth elsewhere, 
/(ii) The indirect 
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(ii) The indirect benefits of transport are spread throvighout the 
econongr; however, the major share of these benefits goes to the regions 
and their urban centers served by the best transport facilities. 
These conclusions indicate clearly that investments in transport 
facilities can play a key role in regulating the process of urbanization. 
On the one hand, lagging regions may be stimulated by systmatically 
anticipating their transport needs, and, through the lower costs achieved 
by creating improved facilities, additional economic activities may be 
channeled toward these regions. On the other hand, overconcentration in 
a few urban centers can be counteracted by creating disincentives through 
geographically differentiated transport charges, 
IV, CONCEWTRATION 
As indicated in the introductory section of this paper, it will be 
convenient to break down the problaa of geographical concentration into 
two sub-problems, to be referred to as "regional" and "metropolitan" 
concentration. The first of these refers to the interrelations of urban 
nuclei of different sizes, each considered together with its tributary 
region; the second refers to the problms of internal organization of a 
metropolitan center said its tributary region. For example, the problem of 
the concentration of ĉ srnamic economic activities in the Southern industrial 
region of Brazil, at the expense of stagnation in the Northeast, is a 
typical problem of regional concentration. On the other hand, the internal 
problems of the Sao Paulo metropolitan zone, such as the interrelations of 
economic activities in the urban nucleus, workers' housing in the suburbs, 
transportation problems within the metropolitan zone, etc,, constitute a 
typical metropolitan concentration problon, 
A, Regional Concentration ' 
1. General Considerations 
The notion of a regional concentration process involves many economic 
and extra-economic variables. The most important phenomena of regional 
concentration are the following: differential migration rates toward the 
leading centersj selective migration of high-grade labour; the establish-




leading centers, especially in the dsmamic industrial sectors; the con-
centration of income and of markets; the concentration of productive and 
social overhead capital; differential standards of nutrition, health, 
education and social welfare that favour the leading centers and reflect 
thonselves in an accumulation of skills and an increased productivity at 
these centers; a concentratioh of technical and managerial skills, as 
well as of enteiprise as a productive factor; . and an unequal distribution 
of business risks between the leading centers and the peidphery. 
There exists an intuitive notion that concentration has advantages as 
well as disadvantages; and that there is such a thing as "tóó much" con-f 
centration on the one hand, and "too little" concentration on the other. 
Too much concentration involves sharply different growth rates between 
different regions that leave some regions stagnant, while channeling so 
much new activity to other regions that the latter are plagued by dis-
economies, such as metropolitan transport aiti food supply problems, 
excessive land rents, etc. Contrariwise, too little concentration implies 
the dispersal of economic activities among centers of more or less equal 
importance, váiich deprives the economy as a whole of the benefits of major 
urban aggregations. These benefits are, for eacample, the elimination of 
transport costs on many intermediate products that are exchanged between 
different productive processes; the creation of pools of specialized 
labour and technical skills; the ease with which commercial arrangements, 
such as subcontracting, can be worked out in a major metropolitan area, 
thereby promoting a more efficient division of labour; and the development 
of special entrepreneurial skills vMch favour the growth of the country 
as a whole. 
From the notion of too little concentration on the one hand and too 
much on the other, it follows that there should be an optimal degree of 
concentration for any given developmental stage of a country. While so 
much can be readily admitted, it is difficult to define generally accept-
able standards of what constitutes an optimal degree of concentration. 
Generally speaking, in Latin America overconcentration in each national 
economy appears to be moré of a problem than a lack of sufficient concen-
tration, On the other hand, lobkihg at the Latin Ameilcan economic area 




national economies has favoured the emergence of a cociparatively large 
number of fast-grovdng metropolitan areas, ijhich might not have been the 
case under an economically integrated régime practicing the laissez-faire 
principles -which were characteristic of economic policy in the area until 
the mj.d-thirties. 
The issue of optimal concentration xoill be taken up in the following 
section, dedicated to policy problems. In the present section, the 
mechanisffî i responsible for concentration will be inspected in more detail. 
The Concept of "Feedback Systems" 
All mechamisms of concentration are closed chains of causation, 
technically called "feedback systems"o An example of a feedback systaa 
has been discussed in the previous section, in connection with investments 
in transport facilities. It is recalled that in this system the chain of 
causation ran from hi^er investments to lower transport costs to hi^er 
traffic density to more investments] and conversely in the other direction,, 
The Ghax.\̂ e3 both upward and downward have been seen to be ciumilativej in 
other vrordSj any existing tendency vj-as found to reinforce itself through 
a chain of causes and effects^ The circular chains of causation, also 
called "feedback loops", can be represented schematically as follovrs (see 
Fig. 1): 
Figure 1 
Transport Feedback loops 
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The kind of feedback system which, as the transport investment system 
pictured above, tends to reinforce its own changes cumulatively, is said to 
be characterized by "positive feedback". In other words, the indirect effect 
produced by an original change in a •variable, which through a chain of 
induced events finally comes to react back on the given variable itself, 




may be observed in the feedback loops of Fig, 1 that the above statement 
is true for every one of the variables in tbe loopo 
Conversely, negative feedback is observed when the indirectly indueerl 
change has the opposite direction as the original change, thereby diminich-
ing its magnitude. An example of negative feedback is a mechanism which 
tends to reduce differences between vjages in different areas. Where wages 
are low, more labour-intensive production techniques are used in the 
productiva processes; tMs increases ths demand for labour, thereby 
raising its price» Miere wages are high, the mechanism runs in the opposite 
direction^ In both cases, the induced price movement counteracts the 
deviation of the ori^nal price level from the norm of labour pilces. The 
corresponding feedback loops ere shown ia Fig, 2: 
Ylgara 2 
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It is noted with reference to Fig, 2 that, as the cycle of cs,usation 
runs the second time around the loop, all changes are reversed, while the 
third time they are again in the original direction,' etc. 
Positive feedback always results in self-reinforcing change. Negative 
feedback results in self-regulating adjustment to an equiJJLbrium. state, 
unless the feedback is so strong that it "overshoots" the original deviation 
in the opposite direction, thereby giving rise to ever wider oscillations 
about the equilibrium state» 
With regard to the spatisQ. structure of economic growth, negative 
feedback effects are on the whole much weaker than positive ones. The 
negative feedback effects tend to keep the growth rates oi' different 
regions in step with one another5 the positive feedback effects, contrari-
wise, tend to induce divergences in the growth rates. The observed concen-
tration effects reflect the dominance of positive feed'oack, 
/3o Mechanisms .of 
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3» Mechanisms of Concentration 
In the present section, the individual feedback roechanisms connected 
with concentration and dispersion -will be examined in details In order 
to permit a synopsis of the large variety of mechanisms;, Table 1 has been 
prepared, láiich presents a classification of the principal mechanisnisa 
This cls,sEification is of course not the only possible one, nor does it 
pretend to completeness; for example, a variety of political-sociological 
mechanisms may be advanced that would extend the list. Neverthelessj, the 
table is believed to be usefiil for a first orientation in this largely 
unexplored field, 
(a) Mechanisms Connected -with Labour 
The choice of technique, i.e.j, the selection of laboTir-
intensLve vs. capital-intensive prodxiction processes for the production 
of a given comraodity, has two opposite effects on wage rates and thus on 
income leirels in different geographical zones. On the one hand, throu^ 
the medi'-m of labour productivity, it has a strong concentrating effect; 
on the other hand, tlurough the medium of the supply-^and-demand situation 
in the factor marfcets, it has a weaker equalî .ing effect. 
The first mechanism works in the following way. In high-xiage areas, 
it is attractive to choose more capital-intensive and less labour-intensive 
techniques. This raises the productivity of labour.. The increased 
productivity, in turn, creates the basis for successful laboia* pressure 
for capturing at least part of the fmiits of this increased productivity, 
in the form of wage increases that raise the originally high level of 
wages even f\irther, thereby reinitiating the cycle. Conversely, in low-
wage areas, the stagnant levels of wages and of productivity \̂q.11 be 
perpetuated by the choice of labour-intensive techniques. 
The second mechanism is identical wi.th the former one in its first 





A SURVEY OF FEEDBACK KSGHANISMS COmjECTFD VilTH 
(EOCEAPHICAL CONCENTRATION AiJD DISPERSION a/ 
A, Labo'txr 
(i) Technique of proclTiction: 
technique-productivity cycle 
- technique-factor demand cycle 
(ii) Location: 
* location-productivity cycle 
- location-factor demand cycle 
•s. location-market cycle 
(iii) Migration. 
- migration-'labour supply cycle 
^ migration-productivity cycle 
(iv) N.H.W.E. (Nutrition, health, welfare and education): 
N.H,W.E.-product!vj.ty cycle 
Capitaj. 
- interest-capital supply cycle 
risk-capital supply cycle 
entê rpri-se-capital supply cycle 
C^ Social Overhead Capital 
social overhead capital-productivity cycle 
* social overhead capital-location cycle 
•«• social overhead capital-risk cycle 
D, Transport 
f- transport investment-traffic volume cycle 
(Also note follovn.ng one-way causations: 
transport cost-migration effect 
transport cost-product distribution and location effect.) 
E» Ag^omeratioa 
« coneentration-external economy cycle - concentrations-external diseconomy cycle 
F, Balance of payments 
(Note: these cycles equilibrate the balance of payments, but 
disequilibrate growth rates.) 
- terms of trade-income cycle 
- employment-income cycle 
G, Fiscal policy 
- income-tax payment cycle (progressive taxes) 
* income-tax payment cycle (regressive taxes) 
- social overhead benefit-spesifiic tax cycle (effective tax) 
- social overhead benefit-specific tax cycle (effective srab-
sidy) 
a/ denotes positive feedbackj negative feedback. 
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However¡, in this second case a different effect of the choice of 
technique is brought into play: . its effect on the factor aiaricets,: In 
high"wage areas, the choice of capital-intensive techniques diminishes 
labour demand and increases the demand for capital, thereby tending to 
lower the relative price of labour« Conversely^ in low-XArage areas, the 
choice of labour-intensive techniques tends to increase the demand for 
labour and thereby to raise its priceo The effect of this second mechanism 
is to lowi-r the wage rate in high-^rage areas and to raise the wage rate in 
low-̂ ííage '¿ones; in other words, it has an equalizing or leveling effect, 
instead of a concentrating one« 
The important question arisesj on the balance;, which of the two 
effects of the choice of technique is domnant, the concentrating effect 
or the equalising effect? In other words, does the choice of technique 
have a net concentrating effect or a neb equalizing effect? It is to be 
noted that classical economic theory emphasized the equalizing effect, to 
the practically complete exclusion of the concentrating effect® It is, 
however, obvious that the equalizing effect can work efficiently only when 
the labour supply is inelastic in the low as well as in the high-wage areas 
so that moderate changes in labour demand may be reflected in significant, 
wage changeso Generally, this is not the case,, In the low-viage area, a 
large reservoir of tmemployed or underemployed labour makes the supply of 
labour exx-remely elastic; while in the high-wage area, the wage level will 
usually be more sensitive to institutional factors than to the demand of 
labour. The wage level in high-wage areas is typically determined by 
institutionally enforced collective bargaining, and is based more on the 
ability of the employer to pay than on labour supply and demand» An 
interesting corollary of this situation is a concentration effect that 
operates not only geographically, but between different branches of economic 
activity at the same location as well„ There is a gradation of wage levels 
from the most dynamic and productive indvxstries, which pay highest, to 
commercial activities, which pay considerably less, to floating marginal 
employment, which may offer little over the bare subsistence leval. The 
differences are maintained by a careful compartmentalization of labour, 
institutionally enforced, which prevents competition between members of 




activities» Clearly, the incentive for capital-intensive techniques will 
be greatest at the top, which raises productivlty..fastest. drawing the top 
echelons of wages after it; while at the bottom, t-hQre will be a stagn-
ation of wage and productivity levels. 
While it would be extremely interesting to have an empirical stuc^ 
of the relative forces of the Qorxceutration and equalization effects, it 
can ba stated with fair confidence on the basis of the foregoing observations 
.that the concentrating effect has the upper hand, 
(ii) The choice of location for given productive activities, as well 
as its counterpart, the choice of particular prodiicts or services to be 
produced at given locations, jias concentrating and equalizing effects very 
similar to the ones discussed above. 
The effect of productivity is again a concentrating o;i9o In high-̂ iiage 
areas, there will b,e a tendency for the location of more capital-intensive 
production activities, ̂ Mhich will lead to increased productivity, and 
ultimately to even higher vrage levels; while low-iíage areas will, tend tb 
attract more labour-iutensive acti\lties, which usually have a lov/er 
productivity and thus provide a weaker stimulus for the raising of wageSe 
On the other hand, there is an equalizing m.echanism analogous to the 
one discussed before, which acts through the supplj?- and dema.nd for labour^ 
reducing the e:xcess supply of labour in the low-wage area, and raising it 
in the high-wage area. The same considerations apply to the relative 
strengths of these two mechanisms as the ones cited earlier» 
The above conclusions should be qualified from txío points of view, 
(i) A stagnant regional econon̂ r would often welcome labour-intensive 
productive activities, such as textile mills or the asseanbly of electroni.c 
products, if it could only get them, since the additional employment, in 
spite of the low prevailing wage levels, would be far better than no 
employment at alia Many backward areas pin their hopes on such labour-
intensive activities to a degree which is pathetic, in view of the fact 
that while lovr wages may often be a necessary condition of attracting, 
certain industries, they are almost never a sufficient condition. It 
should be kept in mind that low vrages do not imply low labour costs, if 
productivity is low in a backward area due to reasons of ill health, poor 
education and the like¿, as it usually is» Besides, the backward area 
. ' /typically lacks 
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typically lacks indispensable co-operating factors of productionj, especial-
ly social overhead capital "and entrepreneurship, Fina^y, the advantages 
of lower labour costs may be outweighed by an added factor of risk in the 
backward area. As a réŝ olt of these consideratious, which constitute 
independent concentrating cycles in their o\m right, the effects discussed 
before,are often submerged, (ii) Locational choice gives rjUs e to a 
concentrating cycle in many ways more important than the location-
prodiKtivr'.ty ard location-factor demand cycles cited above^ namely the 
location-narket cycle^ This cycle has its origin in the strong attraction 
many industries and other ecnnoraic activities experience with regard to 
their markeiiSe The principal markets are found at locations of consider-
ab3.e population concentration. If wage levels are higher at such locations 
this raises the average incomes and thus enlarges the markets?. New 
productive acti%'ities that are attracted to locate at such pre-existing 
conceatratj.ons give rise to additional income, which enlarges the market 
even fucther, thereby increasing its attraction as a productive location. 
Thus, a self-reinforcing cycle is set in motion, Thjs cycle will be 
further reinforced if, beside market orientation, the industries attracted 
to the markets are also characteriaad by economics of large scale in their 
productive processes. If this is the case, smaller markets will not be 
served from independent plants, since the cost of operating several smaller 
plants wi]l. be considerably higher than the cost of operating a larger 
plant. Accordingly, the concentration process will converge on the 
location of the largest markets, serving smaller markets from these 
locations up to distances determined approximately by the balance of 
additional economies of scale on the one hand and additional distributioa 
costs on the othere 
(iii) I-ligration gives rise to a third set of feedback mechanisms 
connected with labour,, The classical economic mechanism propounds that 
vjage differences or unemployment pressures give rise to migration from 
low-wage (or unemployment) areas to higher-wage areas, thereby reducing 
laboiir supply in the low^wage zone and increasing it at the high-xfage zone, 
until wage differences are elimiiiateda This is a negative-feedback 
system to be referred to as the migration-labour supply óyele» Evidently, 




persistent international and interregional wage differencese As far as 
international migration is concerned, the institutional barriers are of 
Course obvious. It is harder to account for disequilibritaa situations 
notoriously observed between regions of a sirigle country, which, it sho'oLd 
be noted, are generally more severe in underdeveloped countries than in 
more advanced ones. 
The migration-labour supply cycle clearly has some major limitations^ 
It should bo pointed out, first of all, that even in the absence of any 
competing mechardsm, the equalization of wage rates does not follow from 
the structure of this cycle, only the narrowing of wage differentials that > 
would exist in its absence. If, for example, the natural population 
increase in the backward region is strong, labour supp3.y may rise and the 
wage differential -with respect to a more advanced region may vri-den, in 
spite of the migration-labour supply cycls, (A pedestrian, or shall we 
say nautical, iU.ustration, is that of a bathtub, which may overflow even 
when the stopper is out, if the water is poured in fast enough.) 
In practice, the migration rate is seldom high enough to solve the 
problem of stagnation of a baclcward region. Moreover, there are costs 
associated with migration that often prevent it from taking place at any 
considerable rate, in spite of the strong pressures than may exist to 
promote it, vintil a point of such desperation is reached that an abortive 
and catastrophic attempt at mass migration may be undertaken. 
It is suggested occasionally that the large empty tropical zones of 
a number of Latin American countries vrauld be suitable for absorbing the 
surplus population of some desperately overpopulated regions in these same 
countries, adducing in support the massive pre-Columbian migrations that 
are known to have taken place in the Central American regions and elsevíhereo 
The difficulties would, however, be so formidable, and the human costs so 
appalling, especially in terms of mortality, if a transition frora upland 
climates to tropical zones, with their endemic diseases, were involved, 
that this solution is in fact less attractive than almost any alternative 
policy approach, 
A second limitation on the migration-labour supply cycle is that wage 
differentials, even though they exist, may be made partly ineffective by 




labour td-th respect to wage rates, vAiich has been cited earlier, vdll 
reduce the effective vrage differential for the migrant very substantiallyj, 
sin.ce upon entering the more advaiiced zone, he vdll find himself 3.t the 
bottom of the pjrramid, among the group of marginal workersc It should, 
nevertheless, be noted that the chances of eventual betterment, especially 
for a young and vigorous or a trained worker, e.re considerably more 
favourable in the advanced metropolitan zone thexi in the backvxard area» 
Thi-T- leads directly to the consideration of a second mechanism connect-
ed -with migration, líhich is characterized by positive feedback, ar?.d thus 
tends toward concent-rationo This mechanism rests on the selective 
migration of persons: in other i-iords, the preponderance of the young, 
the healthy, the unattached, the better trained and the better qualified 
among the migrants o Since this raises the average productivity of the 
population at th3 canter, while reducing it correspondingly in the backward 
zone, it contributes to the id.dening of the v/age and income differences 
vrhich induce mi-gration in the first place^ 
(iv) Nutrition^ health, welfare and education lilcewise give rise 
to positive feedback systems through the agency of productivj.tj'-o The level.s 
of a].l these desiderata are better in the high-wage and high-income zones, 
partly because people can afford to avail thsmsslves of these services to 
a larger extent through ordins.ry market channels, and partly since many 
kinds of these services are provided on a collective basisj in the latter 
case, the higher per ca.pita incomes in the advanced zones create the basis 
for higher levels of the corresponding services» The net effect in each 
case is to raise productivityj this, in turn, is translated into h:lgher 
per capita incomes. Conversely, in the low-wage and low-dncome zones, 
the standards of nutrition, health, welfare and education, as well as the 
standards of productivity, tend to stagnate. 
It should be noted that, while each of the services that have been 
mentioned may give rise to a feedback cycle of its own, they are also 
interrelated among themselves. For example, poor nutrition of school-
cliildren notoriously leads to poor scholastic achisvementso The inter-
relations of the various feedback systems will be discussed in more detail 
/(b) Mechanisms Connected 
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(b) Mechanisms Connected with Capital 
The classical mechanism related to capital is the interest rate-
capital supply (and demand) cycle. This negative-feedback system rests 
on the flow of capital from regions of low interest rates to regions of 
higher interest rates. Coirrespondingly,, capital supply increases where 
interest is high^ decreases where interest is low; this, in turn, brings 
about a negative-feedback adjustment of the earlier interest rates, tend-
ing to eqixalize thsiTi, 
This mechanism, has a low degree of appLLcability \inder almost any 
practical conditions, but especially so in underdeveloped countries» 
It should be noted that this mechanism, to the extent that it 
operates under a given set of practical circumstances^, will tend to re-
inforce two of the cycles discussed earlier with reference to labour, 
namely the technique-factor demand-the the location-factor demand cycles, 
•which are characterized by negative feedback» However^ in underdeveloped 
countries this mechanisn has little practical effect. Market interest 
rates have little meaning, since access to capital is rationed, and the 
rates are far from being equilibrium rates (in the sense of eq̂ aatir̂ g 
the supply and demand of capital.) Thus, it is difficult to decide 
whether the mechanism operates or not: it may be adduced that it would 
operate if only the differences in interest rates were large enough to 
have a measurable effect» Moreover, the effects of this mechanism are 
often confovinded with the element of risk» If no capital movements are 
observed to take place, in spite of apparent differences in market 
interest rates, it is argued that the difference in interest rates is 
just enough to compensate for additional risk, and that, accordingly, no 
"effective" difference in interest rates exist» If this reasoning is 
accepted, the explanation of capital movements becomes in good part 
tautological. 
The problem with the foregoin̂ g use of the concept of risk is that it 
is not quantified independently from the process it is supposed to explain. 
Such a quantification is, however, entirely possible, "Risk" can be 
defined, for example, as vary3.ng inversely with the number of successful 
business ventures in a given zone. 




capital can be introduced, which is characterized by positive feedback. 
The cycle operates as foUoxirSo Low-risk zones, i.e,, the ones with many 
successful business ventures, attract capital, and lead to the establish-
mer± of additional economic activities. This, in turn, lowers risk even 
further and makes the zone ever more attractive for capital infloWe Con-
versely, backward areas, which have few economic activities, are by that 
very fact high-risk zones, and tend to offer a disincentive to the i.nilov/ 
of ce.pita?.,. 
Beside the factor of risk pertaining to the localization of a gi.ven 
economic activity, there is another aspect of investment risk which like-
wise leads to a positive-feedback systema This aspect pertains to the 
di-̂ ''ersification of risks within the investment portfolio of an individasl 
investor® In a region xAth c limi.ted set of economic opportunities, little 
investment diversification is possible locally, and therefore it will be 
natural for a substantial fraction of indigenous savi.ngs to seek an outlet 
in other regions, Nattirally, the capital drained away in this fashion 
retards the diversification of the baoto'íard region, by slowing down its 
over-all development» Conversely, a more advanced and therefore more 
diversified region will be able to hang on to a larger or overwhelming 
fraction of its savings, and thereby promote more rapid growth and an 
attendant further diversification^ 
A further cycle referring to capital which is also characterized by 
positive feedback is based on th® entrepreneurial factoro It is well-
known that one of the impediments to the development of backtvard areas is 
the lack of local business and entreprensurial talent líhich would organize 
new ventures, talcing advantage of the x'esources of the area in question» 
Thus, if favourable conditions for certain economic activities exist in 
a backward area, these activities might still be at a net disadvantage 
with respect to more advanced regions simply for the reason that they are 
never worked out in deta3.1 and prornoted efficientlyc For example, even 
conditions of preferential financing offered to a backward region by an 
economic development agency (which represents capital v.lUing to move 
"uphill", against unfavoureble risks), may remain without effect if no 
investment projects are submitted from the region in question, or if they 




The positive-feedback system operates ivith respect to the entrepreneur-
ial factor through the agency of a dynainic business, environment, which is 
the only effective source of additional entrepreneurial,talente Thus^ 
where there is a greát deal of econondc activity, more entrepreneurial' 
talent va.ll be generated/ which in turn wi3JL attract capital and promote' 
additional economic activities for the advanced region,. In the backv/ard, 
region, contrariwise, no indigenous entrepreneurial talent will be raised, 
for lack cf a business climate, and the lack of entrepreneurs will prevent 
the attraction of capital ^ d the initiation of a more intensive business 
activity. 
As' a result of the combined action of the positive-feedback systems 
based on risk and on the entreprensurial factor, capital is far more li.kely 
to flpw on its own account from backward regions to advanced regions than 
in the opposite directioUo The resultant syphoning-Kiff of cavir̂ gs froia 
the periphery to the center is, in fact, one of the ills generally 
recognii'.ed. in counbiues \vith significant regional problems» It is, of 
course, alpo an international problem with regard to underdeveloped 
countries as a group versus the major metropolitan centers of the world® 
(c) Mechanisms Connected with Social Overhead Capital 
The principal cycle connected with social overhe¿.d capital is a 
positive-feedback system, with productivity acting as the most important 
link in the circular chain of causation^ . The mechanism works exactly like 
the other ones discussed earlier that operate through productivity,,..to wit: 
in.advanced areas, there..is more .social overhead capital} this increases 
the productivity of all investments and thereby per capita incomss in the 
area;, these, in tuẑ ,,: create, the, basis for increasing social overhead.̂  
capital investments in the area» Contrariads.e, in backward regions, the. 
lack of. social overhead capital holds productivity down, and thus helps 
to maintain, income at stagnant loyels, which malees it more difficid.t'to_ 
create more, social overhead.capital out. o . ̂  - . 
A related positive-feedback system work's through..loc.a,tibnal a,ttraction: 
new investment-s are .attracted to, senple existing ̂ stocks o.f spcial overhead 
capital, and by the addj-tional incoEie. t h ^ generate, th^. provide, in turn, 
the basis for fijrither additions, to. social, overhead capital in the mpre 




Beside the two cycles discussed above^ social overhead capital may 
be related to business risks. In an earlier section it has been suggested 
that the number of successfiil business ventures in a region be used for 
the quantification of risk; this concept may, however, be refined by the 
inclusion of the existing stocks of social overhead capital in a given 
zone among the factors that determine the chances of success of a ventureo 
If this concept of risk is accepted as realistic, then an additional cycle 
can be stô êd, which runs from more social overhead capital to less risk 
to more nsw business ventures to more income, and finally to a positive 
feedback on social overhead capitalo In backward regions, the cycle runs 
in reverse. 
An additional cycle related to the financing of social overhead 
capital will be discussed in a subseqiient section, 
(d) Mechanisms Related to Transport 
The transport investment-traffic volume cycle, which constitutes a 
system vátb positive feedback, has been discussed in d etail in connection 
with social overhead capital embodied in transport facilities, in Section 
III-B-2, The effect of this cycle, as has been indicated there, is to 
concentrate economic activities, inconies and transport facilities in the 
more advanced zones. 
In addition to this feedback system, there are also important, one-way 
effects arunrá.ng from transport to migration and to the location of 
production and product distribution. These effects play an important role 
in the study of a question that has been open for a long time, to wit, 
T^ether a lowering of transport costs has a concentrating or. a dispersing 
effect on economic activities. As has been amply revealed in the previous 
pages, any given variation is likely to have differing and often contrary 
effects, through separate mechanisms of causation. The effect of a lower-
ing of transport costs is no exception to this observation. On the one 
hand, a lowering of transport costs is equivalent to a closer union of 
geographically separated markets; this has the effect of reducing the 
spread of factor prices (wages) and the prices of products and services, 
through the ordinary operations of the market mechanism. This effect is 
equilibratingc On the other hand, a lowering of transport costs ejcposes 
the generally less efficient economic activities of more backward sones 
/to the 
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to the intense competition,of. productive activiii es loeated at the more 
advanced centers/ and thereby tends to. damage-them or at least slow dovm 
their growth considerably, Ifeich ione of the tvjo .effects ,is likely to be 
dominant? • Mo ánsv/er cancbevgn.ven tp this question, in.-the. abstract, 
especially sineé the- answer is apt ito vary with the:-level, of transport 
costs. In, other vords^ ;at-near-zero. lévels of-transport: Costs, the 
balance will perhaps^ be in^favour'of; the equilibrátirig; effectj while at 
somewhat hi.gher levels it may favour the Concentrating effect« Much, 
depends on the relative mobiliti.es of goods on the one hand and meiobers 
of the working force on the other» Different results are likely to be 
obtained if workers can comnuite to central zones frém'areas with a radius 
of two miles, ten nales, or fifty mi-leSo Here is a tremendous task of 
empii'-icaJ. research, vjhich would be of great significance for policy 
decisions especially under the conditions of thé underdeveloped countries» 
(e) The Mechani.sms of Ág¿;loaeration 
The concept of agglomeration is used to denote a set of interactions 
between economic activities that are grouped geographically close together. 
Agglomeration has already been mentioned briefly in the section on location-
al forces (see Section II-A}s It is reca,U.ed that agglomeration, effects 
are of two classes; economies of scale - v/hich can be interpreted as 
arising from the interaction of identical processes - ^ d economies of 
interact!on.between dissimilar processes, such as the elimination of 
transport costs on intemediate products, the development of , a common 
laboiar pool' with special, skills, common seryi.ce and marketiiig facilities, 
etc. All of these effects give rise to a positiye-feedback system. It 
has not, however, been mentioned heretofore that agglomeration can also 
give rise to diseconomies. There are certain cost elements associated 
with production that increase with scale. Some have sinple technical" 
reasons: for example, temperature control becomes progressively more 
complicated in the interior of larger reaction:vessels in the chemical 
industry. Other excess .costs are coranected 'witii the increasing complexity 
of coKuiBinications and co^qnJination in .lsa:ger ,orgajniaations, AneQ-ogous ' 
diseconomies arise in the geographical intera.ction of dissimilar processes, 
which become especially noticeable vihen the degree of concentration and 
. • ' • , /the absolute 
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the absolute size of a nucleus becomes very large, as it can be observed 
in the major metropolitan areas of Latin America and elsewhere. These 
diseconomies are connected with the increasing complexity and cost of 
metropolitan transit and the organization of other common services, such 
as water supp3.y, waste removal, etc. The diseconomies of agglomeration, 
give rise to a cycle characterized by negative feedback» 
Both the positive and the negative feedback systems of agglomeration 
operate tln̂ ough the agency of locational attraction for new enterprises. 
The economies of ag^.omeration increase with the number of economic 
activities that form the nucleus of aggregation; thus, a larger nucleus 
exercises a more powerftil attraction on margr types of new economic 
activities than a smaller one. Accordingly^ a larger nucleus tends to grow 
faster, by capturing px'oportionately more new actimties than a smaller 
one. Of course J, the larger it grows, the more powerfully it will tend to 
attract further activities. The limit to this process is set only by the 
gradual strengtherdng of the opposite forces duo to the diseconomies of 
agglomeratione These also manifest themselves to a larger degree if the 
size of the nucleus increasesc To the extent that t h ^ operate^ t h ^ wil]. 
tend to repel the location of new activities at the given nucleus,, The 
effect of this is a slowing up of the growth rate, iirhi.ch in turn reduces 
growth of the diseconomies of agglomeration. In practice, it vfoxild of 
course be important to know the relative strengths of the opposing forces 
at different aggregation sizeso It appears from the observation of the 
urbanization process tliat the positive-feedback systeia is dominant up to 
very large metropolitan sizes; however, it is not apparent how much of 
the observed concentration is due to agglomerative forces and how much is 
due to the other mechanisms discussed in this section, A clarification 
of this issue is one of the important ompirical tasks that need to be 
undertaken in the field of urbanization studies, 
(f) Mgchanisms Cqimect^ed with the Balance of Payments 
Bveiy geographical region, just as every countiŷ , is subject to the 
restraints of the balance of payments, Tliis balance is a definitional 
identity between the in- and outpayments of an area, which laay be on 
current account - payment for goods or services or capital account 




of payments always bal;iiiceSj the point of balance may neb iiecessarily be 
achieved in a way that is desirable from the point of view of the region^ 
oi' coimtryj in question. Balance may be achieved at a high rats of grovíth 
or at a level of stagnatiorio The most important variables that indicate 
whether the baJ-ance is desirable or not are" the terms of trade^ in other 
words, the price relationship between the tlúngs the region sells and the 
things it buys, and the level of employment. These variables intervene 
in a fund¿j;íiental way in the determination of the growth rate of per capita 
incomes in the region» 
Wiile it is emphasized again that the balance of payments must 
necessarily remain in balance as a wholê i for reasons of defirátion, this 
does not mean that indi.vidual components are altó necessarily in balance. 
For example, if a region imports certain consiuinir goods on 30~day credit 
and then does not actually pay these obligations for two years, this meajis 
that the rest of the vrorld has involuntarily converted a 30-day credit to 
the region into a t^^o-year credit. This item is then out of balance, in 
the sense that the region enjoys a larger amount of long~term credit than 
. the amount that corresponds tc the iritentions of the lenders^ Clearly, 
the situation is unstable, for this method of long-term liriancing brings 
rapid repercussions elsewhere; shipwent of additional goods will be 
stopped, except on a cash basis. In a similar manner, actual imports and 
e",q3crts may get out of balance with intended amourxts that correspond to 
a given constellation of prices, income levels and other determinants of 
the situation, iNtienever the individual items of the balance of payments 
get disequilibrated in this manner, a chain of repercussions is started 
up wlfiich leads to á feedback system» 
There are two feedback systems of evspecial importance that serve to 
keep the actual amounts of current and capital operations in step with , 
their intended amounts. Both are cháracteiúzed by negative feedback' and 
both operate through the leve?is of income; they compress the income of 
a region that tends to import mortí than can be financed out of exports 
and stable borrovlng; contrariwise, they expand the income of a region 
that shows the opposite tendency, Hcwaver, these mechanisms diff̂ er among 
themselves with regard to the way in which the compression or eiq̂ ansion of 




of trade; the second, by changing the levels of employmento These 
income changes, in turn^ give rise to negative feedback effects on imports: 
vrhen income falls, less is imported,., and vice versa» In the case of an 
adjustment by means of the tsrms of tradê , moreo\'-er, there may also resxilt 
a negative feedback effect on esroorbs: at lô Arer prices, total export 
income increases for commodities which have elastic demands» 
While these cycles maintain the components of the balance of pajments 
in equilibrium, they offer no assurance at all that the growth rates of 
different regions will be maintained in step with each other. On the 
contrary, with the typical, export supply and import demand structures 
which characterize developed regions on the one hand and backward regions 
on the other, the maintenance of eqiailibrium in the balance of payments 
necessarilsr implies divergent growth rates, which tend to accelerate the 
growth of the developed regions and maintain the back̂ 'iard regionra in a 
state of stagnation. This is due to the low income-elasticity of the 
tj-pical exports of backward regions (foodstuffs and other primary products) 
and the high income-elasticity of the imports of these same regions 
(capital equipment, intermediate goods, cons-umer products)® There is no 
effective nay of getting away from this conclusion, mless the structure 
of imports is changed in the backward regions^ by means of new productive 
activities established in these regions (agricultural rationalization, 
industrialization, export diversification); or xinless one is willing to 
assume alternately the continuous and increasing transference of immense 
amounts of capital to the backward regions, clearly not a feasible 
a3.ternativeo 
The other feedback mechanisms discussed in this section interact 
vdth the considerations based on the balance of payments to the extent 
that they independently influence the structure of production and the 
location of economic activities; by these means, they participate in the 
determination of exports and inports, and furthermore, the structure of 
stable capital movements to and from each region, iloreover, by acting 
on wage levels and interest rates independently, they also affect the 
level of production costs in each region, which in turn influences the 
interregional terms of trades 
/(g) Mechanisms Related 
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(b) Mechanisms Related to B'iscal Po].icy , , , 
BMscal policy has at least two in̂ joi-bar̂ ó effects cn.regional, con-
centration, First, through the general tax structure, which may be 
progressive or regressive, it can give rise to important interregional 
capital, transfers» Second, througli its selecti.ve incidence (or lack,of 
it) on certain activities or servi.ces,. it may iáfluence the geographical 
distribution of these activities and services., vdth related secondary • 
effectSo, • 
General tax collections that vary strongly with individual incomes 
- regardless of whether th^ are formally income taxes or not - will 
automatic ally lead to proportionately larger tax colJ.ections in the more 
advanced regions of a countrjo If government e;:pencitures are, at the 
same time, evmly distributed, or especia3.1y if they proportionately tend 
to favour the backward regions, the fiscal system will have'̂  an important 
equilibrating effect, tending to equalj.ze regional growth rates» On the 
other he.nd; regressive taxation, especia].ly if coupled vri.th a concentration 
of government expenditxxres at the principal centers of the country, will 
have a concentrating effectc 
Among the specific taxes, the Hiost important ones from the point of 
view of geographical concentration are the ones pertaining to.social over-
head services^ Urban and transport social overhead capital investments, 
as already indicated, convqy a large range of benefits to' productive 
enterprises located in the cities or served directly by ceii>ain transport 
facilities. To the extent that these benefits are not compensated by 
taxes, they constitute an important concentrating effect, leading to a 
positive feedback system. The benefits attract more enterprises to the 
privileged area; these create additional income^ and to the extent that 
social overhead capital is created from local income, or is responsive to 
local needs, the creation of addj.tionaQ. amounts of social overhead capital. • 
will be encouraged in the advanced zones, Convei'«sely, if social overhead .; 
benefits are overcompensated by. specific taxes, there vdll, be a decon-
cenbrating effect» . / ^ . 
4. Interrelations ¿aoñg the Mechanisms of Geographical Concentration^ 
The individual feedback systems connected W3.th geographical concen^ ' 




clearly not independent of each other» In fact, some of the inter-
relations among them, for example the balance betv/een positive and negative 
feedback systems of a certain kind, or the relations between mechanisits 
of the balance of payments and other feedback systems^ have already been 
touched upon during the previous discussion. These interrelations are 
ext-remely important if a quantitative rather than merely qualitative 
understanding of the process of geographical concentration is to be gained, 
since the áynamj,.cs of adjustment of each feedback mechanism are influenced 
by all of :he others vath iiAiich it shares variables. Thus, for example, 
the variable of productivity was seen to be involved in a large number of 
these feedback systems; likewise, the wage level prevai.ling in a given 
geographical zone plays an important role in a n̂lsIlb6r of different feed~ 
back systems. 
The net result of the interaction of all the mechanisms is the 
generally observed strong tendency toward increasing geographical concen-
tration during the course of economic development, indicating the 
dominance of the combined effect of the positive feedback systems over the 
negative ones» Howevex', at the present time the relative importance of 
each of the individual mechanisms, acting in one or the other of the two 
directions, cannot be ascertained, and remains as a problem for future 
research. 
The qualitative understanding of the various mechanisms involved in 
the phenomenon of geographic concentration will, nevertheless, serve as 
an indispensable background in the discussion of sptcifically metropolitan 
problems and the analysis of alternative policies dealing with urbanization 
and economic developments 
Bo Metropolitan Concentration Problems 
The problems of metropolitan concentration are well known: congestion, 
traffic problems, irrational land use, excessive speculation, social deter-
ioration, and many others. These problems will be dealt with in this paper 
only in a summary fashions and in this section, an attempt will be made to 
link them specifically to the generally accepted concepts of economic plan-
rJ-rig, 
A o Maii^t^Failure 
E/CN.12/URB,24 
Page 44 • 
1» Market Failure in Metropolitan Rssource Allocatix>n 
The metropolitan problems listed above, as well as others," such as 
poorly co-ordinated investments in productive and social overhead 
faciDities, the overinvestment in certain types of facilities, such as 
lujoiry housing, and the simultaneous underinvestment in others, especially 
the facilities of working-class neighbourhoods, phenomena; vihich axe 
markedly notorious in underdeveloped areas, can be traced in good measure 
to the failure of the market mechanism. It is, of course, a coniaonplace 
that in mariigr respects the market mechanism in an underdeveloped country 
cannot be relied on to organize efficiently the resources of the econoiryj 
yet i-dth regard to metropolitan pi-oblems, this observation has a special 
force, since in this respect the market mechaixism is vary inefficient 
even in the more developed coxxntrieSc 
For theoretical reasons, the market cannot a3J.ocate land rationally 
between competing uses on a metropolitan scale» Such a scale, even though 
large^fi-om the point of view of the typical individual metropolitan land 
using function, is still quite small when measured by the dimensiono of 
the country as a viholej and more important, the detail of internal dif-
ferentiation within the metropolitan zone is far richer than in the country 
at large. This leads to the follo^idn^ phenomenon: within the meti'opolitan 
area, one.given piece of land is far less replaceable for another piece 
than outside the urban zone^ the consequence of which is the inevitable 
creation of monopoly positions associated with every tract of xirban land . 
It should be noted that the creation of these monopoly positions does not 
depend on the institution of private land ownershi.p; the monopoly 
positions, in the economic sense, would.arise in a similar fashion under 
social ownership, provided that decentralized production and investment 
decisions were to be established. In ax̂ y event, the necessary existence 
of monopoly positions rules out the simultaneous existence of a stable 
price -stmicture^ The contradiction can be resolved on]jr if the individual 
land holcSLng is vanishingly small compared mth the significant detail of 
Tjrban. geographical structure .- in practice, an absurd supposition. 
The consequence of monopoly positions associated vath 3.and holdings 
would theoretically be a- constantly shifting price structure that never 




instability of urban land prices is con^letely submerged under a series 
of other phenomena which would tend to dominate even a stable market 
equilibrium, if one existed. 
First of all, the physical life of urban capital facilities, such 
as buildings, shops, factories, streets, subsurface construction, etc., 
is vfeiy long, and thus typically it takes a long time before urban land 
can be reallocated to a new use, vathout incurring an excessive cost. 
According}̂ .', the time lag of all adjustments is large, and the response 
to price incentives is sluggish. For this reason, large divergences 
between optimal current iise and actual use of a tract of urban land are 
common» Tiiis hides the inherent instability of urban land prices» 
Secondly, the urben land uses associated with social overhead invest-
ments necessarily have to be allocated outside -̂ he market mechanism, since 
the benefits of social overhead capital, by definition, accrue outside the 
market, and thus a social-overhead land use cannot compete with an 
industrie! or conanercial land use on the basis of ms.rket-determined 
productivities. This further reduces the role of the market in allocat-
ing urban land between competing uses. 
As an additional complication, the dynamic effects of economic growth 
in the cities are extremely important: thus, even if there existed a 
perfect price system which took into account all of the present needs of 
a metropolitan area, these prices would constitute inadequate guides for 
investment deciáona, since the latter have to take into consideration 
future needs. For example, it is generally recognized that decisions 
wi-tti regard to the establishment of transit syst^s have to be based on 
estimated future uses, since ulterior expansion of an underdimensioned 
system is very costly„ Accordingly, an adequate system of land prices 
would have to incorporate an allowance for possible future land uses as 
well as for current ones.̂  It should be noted that this theoretical need 
for a price systan that vrould anticipate future conditions, exists with 
regard to all economic activities: however, its importance becomes 
dominant to the extent that low-cost, marginal adjustments are technically 
ruled out. For example, there is no critical need for a caref\il anticip-
ation of the future daaand for haircuts: the corresponding service 
facilities can be created easily as the need arises,, With regard to 
/major, indivisible 
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major, indivisible invastments, hpiiiever, such as basic industiáes, the 
need for considering, future prices together láth current ones is evident,, 
if the decisions are to be made in a decentralized fashion. The 
dominance of future prices in the problem of metropolitan resource 
allocation follows from the long life of urban investments, the resultant 
inflexibility aad the high cost of adjustments if they cannot be avoided,• 
Since future prices are never talc en into account systematicaU.y in the 
market, here is an additional reason why little can be expected from the. ^ 
market as an organizer of metropolitan resource allocation decisions». 
2, The Problem of Urban Real Kstate Speculation 
Real estate speculation creates one further troublesome aspect of the 
metropolitan land allocation problemj but contrary to occasional mis-
conceptions, it does not represent a failure of the market mechanism, but 
rather one of its consequences, socially undesirable as it may be^ 
Speculation is observed whenever the demand for a commodity, such 
as urban real estate, arises in considerable part for asset-holding 
purposes, rather than for the purpose of enjoying the services that the 
given commodity provides, such as housing or commercial accommodations. 
The effect of the "asset-demand" for real estate is to raise its combined 
demand above the level that would be determined by thae "service demand" 
alone» Moreover, the asset-demand often res\alts in a positive feedback 
cycle with regard to- the prices of certain properties. To the extent 
that people buy real estate not only as a fom of holding property or as 
a hedge against inflation, but also with a view to possible speculative 
profits by resale, a given property may appear more' desirable not only 
in relation to its inherent service-determined value, but in relation to 
its previous price increase. Thus, the types of property oa which 
specxilative demand converges originally, fortuitously or in anticipation 
of future service demand, will by the very fact of this initial convergence 
and consequent price rase appe^ even more desirable to later generations 
of buyerss Price increases can continue to the point where t h ^ lose all 
connection vath service-determined v.aluec Speculative cyclés of this 
kind are well-known; the price increases can go on as long as new buyers 




into it, usually by means of a credit expansion* ^ The phenomenon of 
real estate speculation is observed in practically all major Latin American 
metropolitan areas, especially the ones situated in rapidly expanding 
economies» Metropolitan real estate is an exceptionally suitable speculat-
ive medium for several reasons. First of all, there is a real basis for 
price increases in the rapi.d growth of service-oriented dauand in these 
zonesJ then, the major savings in these countries accrue at these same 
metropoli"-.an centers; and the speculative outlet for these savings 
settles naturally on the type of transaction whose object is physically 
close at hand and can pe readily inspected in person. The latter factor 
is especially iiî jortant in view of the fact that self-generating price 
increases require not just a few transactions, but a whole series of them, 
referring to the same class of objectSo 
The socially xindesirable coiisequences of real estate speculation are 
vrell knowHr Speculation, by driving up the prices of tracts of land and 
other m'ban properties, withdraws these properties from many rational 
services-oriented uses; moreover, it makes the allocation of \irban. land 
far less sensitive to changes in service-oriented demsind, since the 
latter is submerged by the high speculative demand; and finally, if it 
manages to anticipate inelastic service-oriented demands (for eixample, 
the demand for a piece of land in the path of a public street) it can 
raise the corresponding prices to fantastic levels. To curb these 
excesses, especially in relation to social-overhead-type land uses^ 
expropriation and the designation of a "fair" compensation is a commonly 
accepted practice even in those countries that give the widest play to 
the market mechanism. 
While this latter type of provision can prevent speculative excesses 
related to one kind or another of social-overhead land use, it is generally 
not suitable for curbing the speculative rise in the price level of the 
entire bocfy of real estate available at and near to, a given metropolitan 
area. In fact, the compensation awarded in connection with e3q)ropriation. 
Famous historic examples of speculation are the Dutch tulip-mania, and 
more recently the stock-market and real-ostate boom of the twenties in 




according to generally accepted standards of fairness, has to be adjusted 
to the level of property values prevsd-ling in the area; thus, it incorpor-
ates the general speculative rise of property values» 
In an underdeveloped country, this general and usually not excessively 
rapid rise of real estate values is perhaps even more undesirable socially 
than the more spectacular, but isolated, instances of speculative profits, 
for the íollováng reasonso . . 
(i) The general rise amounts to a powerful regressive redistribution 
of incomes in the econongr at large, ITie receivers of additional income 
are the narrow higher-income classes of the metropolitan zones who can 
afford to participate in the speculative process» The losers are the 
lower-income \irban classes on the one hand, whose rents are driven up; 
and in addition, to the extent that the cost of social-overhead facilities 
is raised, all contributors to these social-overhead facilities, including 
lower-income taxpayers» are additionally burdened^-
(ii) Investment incentives are distorted. Speculation serves as an 
attractive outlet for savings out. of hi^er incomes, and to this extent, 
productive investments are handicapped. In addition, a series of complete-
ly iinproductive investments are undertaken» It is said that in one of the 
largest Latin American metropolitan areas, the number of improved building 
lots (with streets, lighting, service connections) that have been sold on 
installment credit is sufficient to take care of all building needs for 
the next two generations! These investments represent a frighteni-ng 
waste of a critically scarce productive factor9 
(iii) Credit is misdirected. In underdeveloped countries, vrfiere credit 
has a critically iâ jortant̂  function in the financing of economic develop-
ment, its channelling into real estate speculation makes the sound 
financing of worth-while investment projects-correspondingly more dif-
ficult, • 
(iv) In the last analysis, consumption is stimulated at the expense 
of productive investment. It should be borne in mind that eveiy time, a 
piece of property is bought for speculative purposes, the same transaction 
puts.liquid purchasing pox̂ rsr in the hands of the seller. If the seller, ii 
turn, buys another piece of property with the money, .the second ti*ansaetion' 




encountered fallacy that speculation soaks up financial resources like 
a aporre; on the contrary, the capital gains associated with the 
corresponding sales must find their way out again from the network of 
speculative transactions, and into other channels® Part of these funds 
are invested in capital facilities associated with real estate; land 
imprcvementB^ luxury housing, large office buildings, etc,; another part 
may be invested in other sectors, but this part is likely to be esiall̂  
due to the distorsion of investment incenti.ves; and a considerable 
fraction probably finds its way into higher consioniption expenditures of 
the upper income groupso 
(v) The entire strvicture of savings, credit operations, investments 
and the capital market in general is affected by the existence of real 
estate speculation; as a consequence, any drastic frontal attack on the 
problem, such as the expropriation of all unused urban lots and the 
compulsory lowering of rentals, which has been undertaken in one recent 
instance in Latin America, has a series of repercussions which might be 
veiy difficult to control, especially in the short rm, 
3» Uypan Programming in Context 
It is now widely recognized that the maricet mechaixism cannot be 
relied upon to solve the probj.ffins of metropolitan resoiirce allocation, 
and the concept of a centrally co-ordinated urban programming process has 
correspondingly come to the fore. The notion of city planning and regional 
planning, in the sense of resolving primarily those problems of land 
allocation, transport organization and social functions in metropolitan 
areas tod their tributary zones which the market caiinot handle effectively 
is now widely accepted in the more advcinced as well as the less developed 
countries. In the latter countries, however, metropolitan planning makes 
little sense vdthout co-ordinating this planning process with planning 
in other fi^ds idiere, it is realized;, the market is also fallirog to 
perform its trac3itionally postvilated directive and organizing functions: 
to wit, in the general field of co-ordinating the requirements for 
economic development for the country as a whole» 
In imderdeveloped countries, it is not sufficient to plan urban 
traffic arteries, industrial, commercial and residential zones, the sites 
/of schools 
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of- schools and parksp public housing projects: in one word, the more 
traditional aspects of the city planner's concerns. Even in the more 
developed countries, city plaiming is coming to comprise more and more 
concern for the problems of the economic base of a city, its eraplô Traent 
structure, its attraction for different tj-pes of edonomi-c activities; 
concerns which have a far greater urgency in undsrdeveloped eciir.triés 
countiies \ihere, with increasing urbapiaation, the development- of the 
urban cer¿. crs is inseparably tied up vc-th the development of the economy. 
For this reason̂ , in these countries i't is necessary to consider the 
specifically urban problems in the contecct of the distribution of economic. -
acti-'/ities between urban and extra-urban zones, as veil as between xirban • 
centers of different sizes; and to set the requirements of urban invest-
ments of different classes into the contQ2± of the general problem of the 
distribution of investments in the country^ On the basis of the concepts 
elaborated lieretofore, the elements of an integrated policy towards 
urbaniza-üoa and economic development vd.ll be laid out in the nexi section» 
/ /Vo THE INTEGRATED 
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V. THE IWTEGBATED PñOC2lAi'#IING OF URBANIZATION 
AND ECOfvOMIC DEISLOFMEWT 
This section represents an attempt to fit urbanization into a framework 
of general economic programming for under-developed countries. The discussion 
will be presented in two parts. The first of these, relating to policy 
objectiv es, will present a programming framework modified by the inclusion 
of considerations relating to regional and urban probleiris: the second 
part will discuss briefly some issues relating to the choice of policy 
instruments fisr the execution of the programmes prepared, 
A. POLICY OBJECTIVES 
While there is wide divergence araong specific approaches to the 
programm.i.ng problem in the western orbit, some basic principles stand out 
with sufficient cl«.rity to permit a meaningful discussion of the urbanization 
problem in relat:̂ on to economic programming, without the need for entering 
into a controversy on the issues of economic programming itself. The 
following discussion will be centered on the pi-ogramming framework of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America, embodied in a series of country 
6 / 7 / 
studies- carried out in the Latin American region.-̂ ' This framework itself 
is in continuous process of development, and has been somewhat extended 
(by the specific inclusion of social pricing principles) for the purposes 
of the discussion of this paper. The intention is, however, not so much 
to argue the merits of one given programming approach, as to point out the 
kinds ef difficulties that are likely to be encountered when urban problems 
are involved in the economic programming process. 
1, Urbanization Problems and the Economic Programming Framework 
The basic principle adopted in fitting urbanization problems into the 
economic progrananing framework víill be to follow the levels of analysis of 
that framework, and thus break down the highly complex inter-relations 
^ Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru 
7/ See Volumes IT, TIT, IV, V, VIT of the series Analyses and Pro.jections of 
Economic Development, corresponding to the studies on economic develop-
ment of Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Argentina and Peru. (United Nations 
Publications, Sales No. 1956.11,0.2; ].957.II.G.3; 1958.11.0,2; 1949.11. 
0,3 (Volume l), and 1959.11,0,2. See also "Advice and Assistance to 
Governments in Programming E6onomic Development" (E/CN.12/518), 
/between urbanization 
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between urbanization and, economc groivth into smaller, self-contained problem 
areas. Of course, the individual levels of analysis with respect to urban-, 
ization have to be made consistent, ,by means of' successiys revisions cr 
otherwise, with the corresponding levels of general economc programmi.ng, 
as well as with each other. ' 
At the filebal level, the growth profile of the economy in general has 
to be supplemented with the growth profile of the majbr'^areas and their 
metropoliten centras in aggregate tei-ins. In addition, a general policy with 
respect to social overhead investment has to be formidated at this level.• 
At the intersectoral level, the expansion requirements of the individual 
sectors and industries determined, for the econorcy at large have to be 
supplemented with an area-metropolitan breakdown of these expansions. The 
requirements and availabilities of productive factors, as well as of social 
overhead capital, likewise have to be analysed by areas and metropolitan 
districts. Concurrently, the broad outlines of the transport network and 
urban land use in the principal centres have to be laid out in terms of 
physical planning. ' 
At the sub-ssctoral level, the comparison of alternative investment 
projects has to be broadened to include detailed locaticnal analyses. The 
objective ,is to arrive at an area-metropolitan distribution of the more • 
dynamic industries in the economy. Complementary social-overhead investments 
have to be studied not only from the economic, but also from the physical-
planning point of view. At this level of , analysis, the topography of la:nd 
use in individual urban centres and the physical interconnections between 
these centres and their hinterlands have to be set out in detail. , ; . 
At the project-enterprise level, the principal task, is to ensure that ' 
the more backward areas and centres are adequately represented with potentia.l 
investment projects, in. order, to prevent the programming of in̂ -estmerif on ' 
the basis of an incomplete range of ..alternatives, since the latter would 
introduce a. bias in favour of the more advanced zones., This precautioh' 
should extend, to social,overhead investment projects as well as to productive 
investment.' Project plans have to .include physical and topographical detail. 
• ,, ' ' ' /2. Global 
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2. Global Programming and the Concentration Problem 
In setting out programming goals vfith regard to the growth profiles of 
individual areas and their raetropolitan centres within the general growth 
of the economy,, decisions have to be reached regarding the degree to which 
concentration of economic activities is desirable. It has been indicated 
in an earlier section that tocj little concentration as well as too much 
concentration are "undesirable" in a loosely-defined way; the first, because 
it msans a sacrifice of the economies of agglomeration and urbanization 
that could be achieved by greater concenti^ation and the second, because it 
gives rise to serious diseconomies in the overcrowded centres and results in 
the stagnation ef the more backward zones. 
The problem of optimum concentration is one of criteria. It may be 
provisionally affirmed that concentration should be carried to the point at 
which the economies of concentration obtained by moving the location of a 
marginal enterprise from the periphery to the centres are exactly offset by 
the corresponding diseconomies„ This criterion has two weaknesses. First, 
it raises some tricky conceptual and empirical problems. For example, in a 
dynamic grc/'th situation, it would not do to evaluate economiea versus 
diseconomies at current prices, since many effects of a given locational 
decision carry far over int,o the future. Thus, all the problems of using 
future and current prices conjointly are introduced. In addition, the 
benefits due to social overhead capital do not appear at market prices; 
therefore, the problem of corrections for social-accounting purposes is 
introduced. The empirical problem of measuring the economies and the 
diseconomies would be a difficult one even if these considerations were 
disregarded^ In short, the criterion is very hard to apply. However, it 
can be attacked on more fundamental grounds from a different angle. Sinoa 
the criterion considers only economies and diseconomies in general, i.e., 
from the point of view of the entire economy, it shelves questions of equity 
in the regional distribution of the benefits of grovrt-h. Supposing that a 
maximum growth for the econoî y as a whole is ensured by a certain set of 
policies with regard to concentration: is this acceptable if it implies the 
crass stagnation of certain areas, \vhich thus become virtually colonies 




In practice;, there are some obvious net diseconomies of over~concen- . . 
tratipn that can.be observed in the very largest metropolitan centres in 
Latin Americaj however, assuming that these'can be corrected by relatively • 
straightforward urbanis.a;tiqn policies, the question still remains whether 
the growth. pattern is sufficiently balanced as between areas to. be 
accepbabJ.e from the point, of viexif. of eciuity ? And, if not,' how much sacrifice . 
of overall national growth should be accepted; in order to stimulate the more 
'backward aonss ? /These are clearly questions of social policy which have . 
to be dealt with by the processes of policy-shaping. The function of , ' 
professional prograraining in this field is bo work out the range of alternative^ 
internally consistent, possibiiitieo on the Igasis of which a choice of policy 
can be made, (Incidentally, this separation of the two functions is highly 
desirable even when th^ are performed by the saiae individual or group. In 
other words^ it is bad practice to ml:c up technical considerations, and 
considerations of policy.) 
The principal sacrifices of decentralization are connected with social 
overhead capital, transport and productivity. The development of more back-
ward. areas typically requires not only productive investment, but also a ' -
series of auxiliary social overhead investments that could be largely avoided 
by emphasizing expansion in the more advanced areas. A higher i-atio of 
social overhead to productive investment lowers the capital-output ratio: in 
other ;\rards, capital that could have been used to increase national income 
directly, is tied up in improvements that do not yield a directly measurable 
return. In,addition, transport costs may'be increased by forcing the 
development of under-developed^areas; the initially established industries 
will be lacking in local suppliers of raw materials, intermediate products 
and services; .likewise, they will p.ften lack sufficiently broad local • 
markets. Finally,,productivity in'the less developed areas will generally 
be .lower than in the advanced centrese .Lower productivity of labour is 
not necessarily socially harmful,if the under-developed area is.one with a : 
labour surplus; but lower productivity of capital, which is also to be • 
expected, is á direct social sacrifice. • 
• : • • , , A n the 
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In the adoption of decisions as to the comparative growth profiles of 
areas within the national development programme, all of these effects have to 
be quantified to the largest possible extent. It should be noted that many 
of the sacrifices that appear greatest in the short run are, fortunately^ 
of a transitory nature if economic growth is successfully set in motion, 
Thus^ social overhead capital investments fall in proportion to progressive 
development, as they are spread over a larger volume of productive activities; 
transport requirements decrease as the local economy is rendered more self-
contained by increasing diversificationj and productivity improves as a 
direct result of the growth of industrialization. All of the self-reinfcrcing 
feedback mechanisms discussed in Section IIl-A, which woi-k against an under-
developed zone while it is in a state of stagnation^ go into reverse 
and become self-reinforcing growth mechanisms as development attains a certain 
impetus. 
In a later sectionj the instruments of decentralization will be discussed 
in some detail; the present intention is to clarify primarily the ways in 
which over all prograirjming objectives are defined within this field. 
Before the problem is dismissed, it may be mentioned in passing that 
there ai'e some empirical regularities with regard to the degree of 
concentration in the more advanced countries which may serve as a background 
for programming decisions. In large and well-integrated economies, population 
centres follow a hyperbolic rank-size rule, the reasons for v/hich are obsciire, 
but which is well established by empirical observations. This rule states 
that when urban areas in such economies are ranked according to their 
population sizes, the product of their rank by £heir population is constante 
Accordingly, the largest centre is approximately twice as large as the 
second largest, ten times as large as the tenth largest, fifty times as large 
as the fiftieth largest, etc. It is also observed that internally unbalanced 
economies d© not follow the rule. In Latin American countries, the largest 
centres often tend to stand out sharply from the relationship, indicating 
overconcentration. In the absence of more directly useful' criteria, area 




of adjuf!tin¿ "size, relationships to this norm. Likex»risê  decisions \ri.th regard 
to area growths that are arrived at for reasons of policy may also be checked 
against this norm, in order to detect tendencies representing significant 
deviations. 
3 • Global, r̂ 'ograimiing and the Fornüílatlon of a General Policy with Hgspect 
to 'SoGÍa3 Overhead Invsstnient 
. . At the global prograuimirig stage, as indicated in tb.3 foregoing section, 
grov.th profiles are determined for the ecoiiovr̂  as a whole and for the, 
individiaal areas, highly aggregated econoiric ind.icators'being used for this 
purpose. Among these is investment, whose laagndtude is set for the econor^ ,, 
, and .for each area, for every year of the prograrnme.o 
The requirements of individual capital facilities which make up the 
aggregate of investment are determned at lower lex'-els of anal^/sis, on the 
basis of the growth of production in the individual sectors and industries. 
However, this method does not woi-k for social overhead investment. As will 
be shovm xn more detail belov/, the fact that social overhead. investments 
have benefits which by definition are,not priced in the market, makes it • 
impossible to evaliiate their productive contribution directly. As an 
alternative, they may-be assigned as a correlative part of a group of 
productive investment projects; in this case, the entire group, including . 
the social-overhead projects, is evaluated as a unit, ̂  This, method-is, how-
ever, not entirely satisfactory; the more diffuse the benefits of a given 
social overhead investment, the more arbitrary becomes the assignment of 
this investment as a direct burden on a' group of selected productive processes. 
In addition, problems of standards inevitably, arise,. Just how much 
social overhead investment is. necessary as. a complement,to production ?• 
(See Section III-A-3r ) As no direct .answer can be given, the "assignment" 
of social overhead investmshts to productive investffi.ents, discussed aboy?, 
becomes even more indefinite. 
In order to deal with these problems in a pra.ctical way, it is suggested 
that social overhead capital budgeting should be•included from the very first-
in, the global programirdng procedure. Given the aggregate amount of investment 




broken down into categories of productive investment and social overhead 
íjivestmento These tentative assignments have to be revised, of course, at 
a later stage of prograjnming, with reference to lower levels of analysis 
which, as will be seen, include the preparation of detailed physical plans 
(topography, land use, transport system), At the global level, however, 
general decisions have to be taken with regard to the following two issues: 
i) the proportion of productive investments to social-overhead investments 
in the economy; and ii) the regional distribution of social overhead invest-
ments, 
i) What standards of social-overhead investment should be applied to 
the economy as a whole ? In other vrords, should productive investments be 
emphasized to the utmost, at the expense of social-overhead investments, in 
order to arrive at high capital-output ratios, or otherwise, should social-
overhead facilities anticipate to some extent the productive needs of the 
economy. In order to stimulate productive investments ? 
While the discussion of this issue carries over into the field of policy 
instiruments, which will be taken up in detail in the next major section, it 
appears desirable to deal with this question at the present juncture„ 
First, the decision will have to depend considerably on the choice of 
policy instruments in general. If a large part of the economy is left to 
operate on a decentralized basis, as is the case in all CNicidental economies^ 
the stimulating effect of social overhead investments has to be given more 
weight than in a situation where the majority of investment decisions is 
under public control, and where productive investments can be directly 
coordinated with their social-overhead type complements. 
Secondly, the effect of different types of social overhead investments 
stimulates production to different degrees. Thus, electric power is almost 
always the fulcrum of develcpment, and a lag of power facilities behind the 
needs has a very strongly retarding effect. Next to power, transport has a 
key jjaportance. Not as critical in the short run but, it will probably be 
generally agreed, no less vital in the longer run, is the role of education, 




A further consideration with regard to the xompression'of social overhead 
needs is the follotoing; social?-overhead facilities that are complementary tp 
productive facilities through the mechanism of produ'ctivity^ should be provided 
for each sector,,industry or activity in proportion to the dynamic role which 
these activities play in the econpngr as a Whole or in individual regions. 
A special problem arises with regard, to agriculture which, in many under-
developed countries, and regions, is called upon to fulfill a djriiamic role, 
yet which is capable of absorbjji'g enormous founts of social overhead capital 
that cannot be spared for this purpose. In most of thS' covin,tries of Latin 
America, however, this.problem is simplified by the fact that, for the time 
being, investments in rural stora.ge, transport aiid distribution facilities, 
which can be decided on purely technical gi-ounds, have a high priority over 
investment in othej; rural facilities v̂iiich would yield'their contributions 
to the raising of productivity through their effects on the quality of the 
working force, rather than by their direct technical benefits;. 
In sum, the most rational way of taking a programming decision with 
regard to the proportion of social-overhead to productive capital investments 
appears to,be : (l) the. definition.Qf a base line of maximum compression, 
and (2) the subsequfent'relaxation cf the corresponding austere standards. 
This relaxation is carried out on the basis of two considerations: first, 
equity, social justice and, incidentally, political considerations; second, 
the need to, provide adequate incentives for the large decentralized business 
sector of the economy which has to carry , a iaa.jor. pai't of the total 
responsibility for economic growth. It ,,is emphasiaed that¿ in any event, 
•the original proportion set at the global level is a tentative one which • . 
has to be revised repeatedly on the basis of the detail disclosed by the, 
lower levels of analysis. ; 
^ It is interestjjig to point but that the logic of the maxiniura compression 
of social overhead needs is simply a variant >of the argument that a 
highly regressive, distribution of real incomes promotes economic growth. 
/ii) • Thé' 
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i-) The regional distribution of social overhead investments within 
the global programming framework can be undertaken largely on the basis of 
the same principles which have been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. 
It is assunBd that regional growth rates have already been decided upon, and 
aggregate investments have been assigned to each region. The proportion 
between productive investments and social overhead investments in each region 
can then be undertaken by initially determining a base line of maximijun 
compression of social overhead investments; this can, subsequently, be revised 
upward on the basis of the tv/o considerations mentioned before, equity and the 
incentive effect on decentralized business expansion. In the case of individual 
regions, it should be noted, the latter effect has especially great importance, 
since inadequate stocks of social overhead capital in backward regions set in 
motion a positive-feedback system that tends to concentrate decentralized 
business investments powerfully in those areas better provided with social 
overhead frxilities. (See Sec. K~A-3). 
As a result of the existing, t/pically uneven, distribution of social 
overhead facilities between different areas and urban centres in Latin American 
countries (and probably elsewhere also), the policy of maximum compression 
of social-overhead investments, accordin§;ly, has the strong concentrating / 
effect noted above. On the other hand, the upward revision of the standards 
of social overhead investment in individual backward regions is one of the 
powerful instrvunents for counteracting the tendency for excessive concentra-
tion in these countries. To what extent this instrument m i l be.used, is a 
matter that depends on the relative weight and the dynamic role of the 
decentralized business sector, as well as the availability of other instru-
ments for controlling concentration. These issues will be discussed in 
Section V-B. 
4» Intersectoral programming and the Re;;ional Distribution of Activities 
At the level of intersectoral programming areas breakdovms of the 
expansion requirements of individual industries and other sectors of economic 
activity have to be prepared. The regional breakdowns, of course, have to 
be consistent with the aggregate gro\rt.h profiles of each region incorporated 
in the global level of planning; in addition.they have to be structurally 
balanced in each region, and further have to be directly related to the 




It has been noted before that the intersectoral level of ahalyvsis, 
even v;hen couched in aggregate tei-ms for the econoiiiy as a whole, i^e., vdthout 
área distinctions, implicitly incorporates certain assumptions with regard 
to the area distribution of activities. For one thing, social overhead 
capital requirements associated with production differ, between regions. 
These requirements, which are formally included in final demand, cannot be 
quantified accurately unless the regional distribution of economic expansion 
is visualiirsd. Capital and lab-mr requirements, and even more so transport . 
requirements, also vary with the regional distribution of production. These, 
implicit assujnpticns are clarified and made explicit by the regional brealc-
down indicated above,. 
The requirement of structural balance in each area is related to the 
v;ell"kno>.'n concept of balanced' grovrbh which has been expounded many times as a 
a requirement for the development of underdeveloped countries. It means, 
among oth?r things, that a region, like a country, cannot develop with a 
stagnant agricultural' sactor (except under the most unusvial circumstances); . 
that no sudden aid drastic'changes can take place in the proportions of 
indufstrialj commercial and service activities; that social overhead capital 
has to grow as production grows. It means, in addition, that an increasing 
proportion of inter-industrial transactions has to take place inside each . 
"v 
area, rather than'by means of inter-area exchanges, as the individual a;reas 
develop. The detail of the web of intersectoral relations within an area 
as well as betiireen areas, is determined by locational consideratiojis; 
however, at the intersectoral levels only the results of the interaction of 
the locational forces are'stated, without an explicit analysis of these 
forces themselves. The breakdown of activities at this level anticipates 
the. results of the sub-sectora.1 analysis; if, subsequently, it is found 
that the latter are in conflict with'the former, they have to be mutually 
' ' " • • 'o/ • • revised to máke them consistent with each other.4 
2/ The area breakdown may. be ach.isved by formal input-output or linear 
programming models that distinguish betwe'en actix'ities in different areas; 
alternately, the simple input-output model for the economy as a whole 
may be supplemented by less formal area breakdowns and projections of 
interarea commerce o In the formal models, consistency and efficiencĝ ' 
(from the point of view of prices) is achieved automatically, but at the 
cost of a high degree of complexity; if iixformal methods are used, 




Concurrently with the intersectoral level of analysis, it is necessary 
to prepare in broad outline the physical development plans of the major 
regions and their metropolitan cores, in order to be able to estimate the 
social overhead capital needs and the orders of magnitude of transport fiosts. 
The preparation of these plans is aided by the simultaneous definition of 
the productive structure of each area and the projection of inter-area 
commercial interchanges. 
5. Locational Problems at the Sub-Sectoral Level of Programmdng; 
The sub-sectoral level of analysis is the level of project evaluation. 
As has been noted before, when urbanization phenomena are considered together 
with general economic planning, careful consideration must be given to the 
locational aspects of individual investment projects and of economic enter-
prises in general. 
In practice, it is hardly possible to consider individually each 
expansion of economic activity connected with the development of a country. 
In all occidental economies, the majority of decisions with regard to the 
expansion of productive enterprises is left in private hands; the function 
of planning is prjjnarily to provide a fraraex-vork for these decisions, to 
intervene directly in the development of basic and especially dynamic 
indus;:̂ ries and sectors, to rationalize social overhead investments, and to 
regulate the decentralized private sectors of the economy by appropriately 
chosen incentives and disincentives. Thus, the analysis at the sabsectoral 
level reduced itself largely to the evaluation of major private projects, 
especially if organized with public support, and social-overhead type projects, 
(a) Directly Broductive Investment Projects and Enterprises 
A locational analysis of these projects involves comparative cost studies 
under the price conditions of different areas and urban centres. As 
indicated in the section on general economic planning (Sec. IV-1), in under-
developed countries, market prices are not a suitable criterion of project 
evaluation from the social point of vievr. This is as true of locational 
studies as of others. However, with regard to locational studies an 




accounting prices has to be taken into account. This structure has to be 
derived from the structure of production in each area and from the flows 
of products between regions. ' 
Generally, the social accounting prices of productive factors are related 
to the availabilities and requirements of these factors in the individual 
areas, exactly as in the aggregative axialysis of the econonQr as a vmole; 
likewise, the social accounting prices of individual products are related to ' 
the direct and indirect utilisation of tn« factors in the production of each 
product.. However, it has to be taken into account that products can be 
transported between areas. Therefoi-e,' the social accounting prices of 
products' are subject to this condition: if a product is exported from one.. 
area to another, the social accounting prices in the two areas have to differ 
by the amount of the transport costs betvieen them, v/ith the area of origin 
having the lower social accounting price. If there are no flows of a given 
commodity between two areas, then the prices in them are independent of each 
other and may be determined by local conditions or by intei-actions with other 
areas i 
The locational structure derived for the basic and djmamic industries of 
the economy at the sub-sectoral level has to be consistent with the productive 
structure of each area defined at the,inter-sectoral level. If there are 
conflicts between these levels¿ two kinds of revisions have to be considered. 
First, the aggregate structure of production at the ihtersecto;?al lüvel may 
have to be,adjusted. Secondly, if for reasons of stimulating growth in 
backward areas, more activities are. to,be channeled'to them than indicated 
by the-original locationál .analysis, the system of social accounting prices 
has to be modified, by the, inclusion• of specific subsidies for pi^oductive 
activities in the areas where expansion is desired; thereafter, the -
locational analysis has to, be repeated. • , ,• ; • ' . j ' 
It should be noted that when the aggregate productive structure of an 
area is adjusted at the intersectoral level, the corresponding social , ' 
accounting prices may also have to be modified, since the new productive . 
structure changes the relative scarcities of the productive factors in each • 




(b) Social Overhead Investment Pro.iects 
The evaluation of these projects cannot be iindertaken on the same basis 
as the evaluation of productive investments, since their benefits are not 
quantified by the market mechanism. It might be suggested that these 
benefits should be taken into consideration at social-accounting prices, but 
this would be begging the question, since the assignment of social-accounting 
prices to the benefits presupposes a víay of evaluating them. 
There are two practical ways of dealing with social overhead investment 
projects; in a specific situation, both are best used in a complementary 
fashion. First, the social-overhead investments can be assigned as a burden 
to a group of productive projects with which thoy cooperate. The exact 
natui'e of the interrelations between productive and social-overhead investments 
has to be clarified on the basis of detailed topographical, land-use and 
transport plans prepared concurrently with the sub-sectoral level of analysis. 
The result of this approach is a strong locational attraction of the productive 
investments to the areas which, on the one hand, already have a considerable 
stock of social overhead capital, and cn the other hand, are not yet subject 
to major diseconomies of concentration. The second approach is to assign 
social overhead investment budgets to all areas and urban centres on the 
basis of a general policy relating these budgets to area growth projections 
(See Sec. V-A-3); subsequently, at the sub-sectoral level, each social 
overhead investment project is evaluated, with reference to dfctailod physical 
plans, on the basis of its estimated contribution to productivity ir.. the 
given zone. Thus, social overhead projects of a given zone are evaluated in 
competition with each other, but not in other zones, or with productive 
j-nvestments. 
Projects relating to facilities that have social overhead benefits as 
well as benefits that are priced in the market, such as, for example, poxíer 
plants or housing projects, can likewise be evaluated by any of the two 
methods. If the first method is used, the market benefits of these projects 
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B. POLICr IKS'fRUi'lE.NT 
This section will discuss the various instruments that are available 
forcarrying out integrated policies with respect to urbanization and econoraic 
development, virtiosé goals have been, developed into a consistent and,, in .so far 
as possible,, efficient framework according to the techniques of the foregoing 
section. • ' 
The discussion will be restricted to policy instruments in the fields of 
area and metropolitan concentration, since a general discussion of instruments 
for the execution of economic development programmes is a vast topic all by 
itseK. It should be stated at the outset, incidentally, that the field of 
policy instruments "for economic development is almost Vi-rgin. territory in 
Western economic,theory; such generalizations as do exist have largely been 
adapted, well or badly, from the theory of advanced economies. The ;practical 
application of policy instruments in underdeveloped cSiirntries is, accordingly, 
mostly a matter of oxpsrxsnco 2,n d intuition. . 
A discussion of instruments for controlling concentration is a suitable 
focus for the concerns of the .present paper, since the two other topics 
which have been emphasized strongly, namely?industrial location and social 
overhead capitál, fit in naturally with this discussion, 
1. , Policy Instruments for Controlling Area Concentration • 
The problem of controlling area concentration is, in effect, a .problem 
in decentralization. In economies which' leave the majority of investment 
and production decisions to decentralized private•'initiative, concentration 
is largely controlled by indirect measures, /Even so, there is a possibility 
of directing the location of important basic industries by fiat; however, 
for the very reason that such a course of action represents the most powerful 
and ultimate instrument,, its use has to be reserved for the rare instances 
when other, milder and more indirect, measures fall'short of achieving their ,. ': 
objectives. ' • • . :, •' '• 
In other words, rational planning requires that the fcontrol of concentra-
tion be exercised to the lai'gest possible extent by following the lines of 





The three principal tools for the control of regional concentration 
are the following : 
(i) Centrally directed capital transfers for social-overhead and 
productive purposesj 
(ii) The dispersion of special locational incentives: enterprises, 
factor pools, productivity and protection against risk; 
(iii) The imputation of social overhead capital costs to enterprises 
enjoying the benefits of social overhead facilitiesi 
2. Centrally Directed Capital Transfers 
The most powerful class of tools has been listed first: clearly, with 
large enough centrally directed capital transfers, there can be no difficulty 
in regulating area concentration. This, in effect, is the ultimate tool 
referred to earlier. Nevertheless, even within this class o:" tools there 
are varying degrees of arbitrary control. For example, the differential 
incidence of progressive income taxation between advanced and backward areas 
creates a directed inter-area capital transfer, provided that the benefits 
financed by this taxation are distributed more evenly than the tax collections. 
This mechanism is the least arbitrary among the instruments in its class, 
ajid can be used with good effect to build up the social overhead capital 
stock of the more backward areas. It can be justified especially easily when 
the social overhead investments take the form of major interregional trans-
port connections: these convey their direct benefits primarily to l.he out-
lying areas, yet at the same time they have a wider effect in that they 
integrate geographically the econowy of a country as a whole. 
The provision of capital funds for development banks charged with 
promoting enterprises in backv/ard areas is a more specific form of directed 
capital transfers. Correspondingly, it can have a higher degree of arbitra-
riness, especially if development loans are granted at interest rates which 
are below the social-accounting value of capital for the country as a whole, 
if this is the case, it represents a direct subsidy for enterprises locating 




accounting price of capital corresponding to the more developed zones is 
charged oh these loans, this is not necessarily arbitrary. It is of course • 
true that, due to the greater scarcity of capital in the bactoirard areas', ̂ ^ 
interest rates should be somewhat higher in these" areas. However, in 
practice the aiarket interest rates in the backward areas are greatly raised 
by considerations of risk. To the'extent that the loans granted by develbp-' 
ment banks are founded on well-orgarxiised projects which enjoy the active 
encouragement of planning authorities and are assured of coraplementaiy social 
overhead services^ these risks are greatly reduced; accordingly, the charging 
of an interest rate nornial for the moi'e advanced centres can be largely 
justified. 
Returning to the granting of development loans at subsidized rates: such 
subsidization is not necessarily contrary to the most efficient utilization 
of resources. It should be^kept in mind that in a dynamic growth situation, 
as discuE-yed earlier, not only current prices, but also future prices are 
highly germane to investment decisions, sines the life of an investment 
project stretches far into the future,; Since, in the more backward regions, 
most costs of production can be expected 'to fall relative to the more ' 
advanced aones, as prdductivity rises, agglomeration economies are achieved-
and the structure of production becomes more self-contained, an investment, -
that is somewhat unattractive at current prices can be well x̂ ôrth while 
from the social point of view if evaluated with due consideration gj.van to 
future prices. In such a situation a temporary subsidy, such as a low 
interest development loan that is to be retired within á reasonable length , 
of time, can amount to a correction of the prevailing market prices in the 
direction of the true social accounting prices averaged out over the life of: 
the project. , . ' 
Finally, a drastically arbitrary method of directed capital transfer 
tó an area is the establishment of basic industi'ies in this area by means 
of direct government investments, with littie if any consideration given to 
locational factors^ If such industries enjoy a monopoly position, the extra, 




products) otherwise, they can be operated under continuous government 
subsidization. Clearly, this is the least desirable of all the methods of 
directed capital transfer, and should be avoided whenever possible. 
3. The Dispersion of Special Locational Incentives 
The decentralization of enterprise, factor pools, productivity and 
protection against risk is in practice the cheapest and easiest way of achie-
ving a strong deconcentrating effect, and should in all cases be pushed to 
the utmost, regardless of the application of other instruments. 
The decentralization of enterprise has to be initiated by area development 
agencies (which need not have any lending functions whatever). These have to 
be charged with a survey of the resources and potentialities of an area, the 
preparation of preliminary feasibility studies with respect to individual 
investment projects, the detailed elaboration of the more promising projects, 
the promotion of business ventures based on local capital or on the attraction 
of capital from the more advanced centres; they have to be storehouses of 
information pertaining to prices and transport rates, qualities and supply 
conditions of raw materials and services, and all kinds of marketing inform-
ation; they have to assist private ventures in the adequate exploration and 
preparation of their projects; they have to supply aid and comfort to 
visiting businessmen from the more advanced centres in all respects pertaining 
to locaJ- problems; and they have to continue helping and stimulating newly 
established businesses during their initial breaking-in period or dm ing any 
periods of crisis. In one word, these agencies have to supply the missing 
entrepreneurial function in the area during the initial period of development, 
and have to be centres of managerial excellence thereafter. Their services 
should generally be free. 
It should be pointed out immediately that the fvuiction performed by these 
agencies is not a programming one, even though in practice they have to 
cooperate closely with area programming organizations. 
The decentralization of factor pools refers to the task of remedying 
the id-despread lack of technical and managerial skills, trained labour, and 




With regajrd to technical and mnagerial skills, an effort may be niade to 
supply them directly, in conjunction vdth the development "agencies described ' 
in the previous paragraph. As the .cost of iiiaintai.ning an adequate technicals 
managerial pool is, however, considerablĵ ^ larger than that of running a , 
development agency, it will, be generally preferable to seek some form of cost 
sharing with the enterprises that are benefited,. A low-cost and yet efficient 
way of making the required services available is to. organize channels .of 
instantaneoúfí and efficient communication with technical-managerial organiza-
tions in the more advanced centres, in order to iiiake their services available 
to enterprises in the backward, areas with as little frictional delay as pos-
sible,' The'subsidization of cornmurdcation and travel requirements'aiay 
likembe be considered as a potential lov-ccst solution,' since the marginal 
cost of thsse services is often small to the government, if, for example, 
it operates airlines or telecommunication systems. 
In this same category, should be mentioned the tremendous stim,rilating 
effect' on backward regions tliat can be obtained by the simple device of 
bringing interurban telephone communications to levels of modern efficiency. 
The shackling ini'luence of the often miserable interurban communications 
in Latin /onerica can haiKily b.e overestimated» 
With regard to pools of trained labour, the disadvantage of the backward 
regions can be reduced by well-organized labour training progranmes. The 
cost of these need not be exceoisive, especially if they ai-e coordinaued with 
the establishment of new industries. It is entirely feasible to máke such 
programmes partly iself-supportirjg, by use ,óf á. variety of devices. For . 
example such a device is the lending of skilled labours to nexí enterprises 
which thereupon undertake to provide partial support for training prograirmes ./'' 
at their own plants; these programmes can then be utilized to. train-
additional skilled labour for employment in other irdustries, 
¥ith regard, to the level of productivity of the labour force, thére are 
serious problems of nutrition, healthy education ard general level of living : 
in some backvrard regions. However, this seldoiai poses as serious a- problem 
in Latin America, especially at the urban centres, as for,example in Asia 
• •. \ , ' . , , '̂'or Africa, , . 
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or Africa. Once certain minimum standards are met in these respects, the 
remaini.ng di.fferences in productivity are relatively easy to bridge. It has 
been found in a number of suggestive instances that above the minima referred 
to earlier, productivity is priraarily related to the quality of management, 
rather than to the putative quality of the working force. Thus, by 
concentrating on improvements in the equality of management - a relatively 
inexpensive proposition - spectacular improvements of productivity can often 
be obtained» 
The decentralization of protection against risk is primarily a matter of 
orgcinization, rather than of financial resources. Backward areas are poorer 
risks largely because they offer a smaller diversity of productive resources 
to draw upon: thus, if a sourrje of supply or a service fails, it is more 
difficult to replace than in more advanced regions. There is also a general 
climate of lower efficiency v/ith respect to public utilities and government 
services, which may adversely affect individual businesses, especially if they 
are not managed by persons with long-standing local backgrounds and connections. 
These additional elements of risk in backward areas caji be reduced signifi-
cantly by the work of development and programming agencies. 
Finally, among the factors x̂ rhose supply had to be decentralized, 
industrial development capital has not yet been mentioned. Apart from the 
establishment of development banks, discussed in the previous section, the 
supply of capital for this puiT-')se is influenced primarily by consiocrations 
of risk. To the esctent that risk can be reduced, it will be progressively 
easier to attract outside capital and to prevent the.flight of local savings. 
It has already been indicated earlier that the diversification of economic 
activities, as a region develops, helps to retain local capital by permitting 





4. The imputation of social overhead capital costs 
Since the benefits due to social overhead capital are not priced in 
the market, business enterprises operating in-zones where a large amourit>'v̂  
such benefits accrue, are subsidized at the expense of enterprises operating 
in zones where social overhead facilities and their benefits are more scarce. 
This subsidization creates a strong incentive for new enterprises to be 
located or expansions to occur preferentially in zones with good pre-existing 
social overhead capital facilities. (See Sec. III-A-5)- It has been seen 
e^lier (Sec. IV-A-3) th^t social overhead investments and productivity form 
a self-i-reinforcing feedback system; thus, the iiaplicit subsidization has a 
strong concentrating effect. 
The imputation of charges corresponding to social overhead benefits 
c ^ be used as an instri-iment for counteracting concentration. At present, 
the only form in which such charges are made in practice are mv;|nicipal land, 
property and license taxes: however, there is no attempt to meagurs the 
social overhead benefits received by different kinds of businesses, and to 
charge them in proportion to these benefits, rather than in proportion to ' 
some irrelevant criterion, such as assessed value of property, footage 
fronting on public roads, area occupied, or even income. If charges were 
related to benefits, they would become an imputed cost of operation of the 
individual businesses, and would lead to a corresponding rise of the prices 
of the. products and services pi'oduced by these businesses in the areas served 
by the respective social overhead investment's. - ' . ' ( a' 
If the charges are in good agreement with the benefits received, the •• ̂  
deconcentrating effect is, especially strong in the larger.metropolitan areas 
where the provision of services.,connected with transport, water supply and • 
wastage disposal can be very high; on the other haniá, there still remains 
weaker residual conc,entrati^ effect, especially in relation to smaller 
urban centres, due to the fact that agglomeration economies,are .observed in 
the provision of social overhead services as well as in connection with 




The balance of benefits and charges can also be biased in favor of 
the more backward areas; i.e., businesses in more advanced areas can be 
somewhat overcharged, while businesses in less advanced areas can be left 
with a fâ n3û able balance of benefits versus charges. This, of course, is 
simply a device of regionally differentiated taxation, which can have an 
important deconcentrating influence. It has already been mentioned that 
progressive income taxation has a similar effect. 
It is noted finally that the imputation of the costs corresponding to 
the benefits of social overhead investments can be used as an effective 
instrument for the regulation of metropolitan concentration. 
The control of metropolitan concentration problems has two principal 
aspects. First, if concentration within the metropolitan area itself is t© 
be controlled, the rate of accretion of new economic activities seeking 
space within the metropolitan region has to be subjected to control. The 
instruments serving this purpose have been discussed in the foregoing 
sections. Secondly, once the aggregate of activities to be accommodated by 
the metropolitan region is decided upon, the spatial organization of these 
activities at the core and in the hinterland, as well as the relations 
between the two, have to be brought into conformity with the topographical, 
land-use and transport-organization plans drawn up concurrently with the 
general economic plans. The variety of instruments that can be used for 
this purpose has had to be left outside the field of inquiry of this paper. 
It is, however, obvious that the imputation of the costs corresponding te 
the social overhead benefits received by businesses in various parts of the 
metropolitan zone can be used as an effective instrument for counteracting 
excessive concentration. The basis for the charges, moreover, should be 
the future structure of costs and benefits, rather than exclusively the 
current cost-price situation, since urban investment decisions have long-
lasting effects which can cause serious dislocations mar^ years after the 
investments have been undertaken. 

